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Introduction
This thesis argues for a synthesis between Minskian and complexity approaches. It com-
pares conceptual frameworks, provides an extended example of how a synthesis can be
applied, and considers the formal consequences through a systematic review of Minskian
agent-based models (ABMs). Complexity insights bring forward the connection between
coarse-grained macro-dynamics with fine-grained micro-specifications. In the Minskian oeu-
vre, this translates into linking the levels between speculative microeconomic investment
decisions and recurrent economic fragility. The cyclical patterns of fragility, expressed via
macroeconomic fluctuations, are not the product of exogenous shocks - aggregate cycles are
constituent features of capitalist markets, that are produced by the interactions between
firms, households and institutions. To put it simply, cyclical economic fragility is a complex
phenomenon that requires theories and methods sensitive to complexity itself.
Complex systems thinking involves probing the ways in which patterns are generated
from micro-level interactions, and how those patterns feedback into the micro-level to create
continual change (Arthur, 2013: 2). A system is complex if it is cohered as a non-trivial
sum of its parts, with complexity theory representing a transdisciplinary research pro-
gramme that dissects how this non-triviality comes about. As such, complexity manifests
in many ways; an evolutionary biologist studying the expression of a species phenotype
and a sociologist using structuration theory are both dealing with complex systems. The
framework shares roots with agent-based modelling, inspired by mathematical biology and
co-developed through the computational sciences. ABMs use computational methods to
simulate multi-agent interaction, testing the relationship between microspecifications and
emergent macro-phenomenon. As a result, computational modelling acts as the method-
ological partner of complex systems thinking.
The field of complexity was birthed after the failures of chaos theory and catastrophe
theory, finding itself touted as the prodigal third child of general systems theory and cyber-
netics. Throughout recent years, both heterodox and orthodox economists have commented
that ‘complexity’ represents a novel path toward rectifying the troubles of contemporary
macroeconomics (cf. Colander et al., 2003; Moore, 2006; Arthur, 2013; Zeidan & Richard-
son, 2010; Page, 2016; Battiston et al., 2016). Complexity and ABMs, as an ensemble, are
described as new ‘movement’ capable of rectifying the extant problems of the mainstream
paradigm (Arthur, 2013: 2), by turning attention toward understanding the economy as a
complex system (Tesfatsion, 2002; Farmer & Foley, 2009). The complexity literature has
developed along transdisciplinary lines, spearheaded by physicists, computational scientists
and biologists associated with the Santa Fe Institute (cf. Gell-Mann, 1992; Axtell, 2007;
Farmer, 2012; McCauley, 2009). Proponents suggest that complexity represents the shift-
ing sands of science, ‘shedding their certainties and embracing openness and procedural
thinking’, with both complexity and ABMs using process analysis rather than closed-form
equilibrium solutions (Arthur, 2013: 19). The credibility of this claim is still up for debate,
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as the dominance of positivism and deduction imbued in the tradition of the physical sci-
ences forces a spurious flattening of social reality and its partial its partial expressions, i.e.
empirics. There is overwhelming reliance on ‘letting the data speak’, which not only imbues
scientific faith in what will always be noisy, incomplete economic data, but also mutes the
significance of economic theory (Moore, 2006: Ch4).
This thesis responds to the positivist overtones of the dominant approaches to complex-
ity (i.e., econophysics) by bringing together the work of Hyman P. Minsky and complexity
economics. It explores how critical discourse can inform the theoretical foundations of com-
plex systems thinking. There are many modalities of complexity, and a synthetic framework
can winnow out the appropriate tools to employ in studying economic phenomena. The
Minskian complexity synthesis presents a step forward in building a complex understanding
of capitalist processes, retaining the prognosis that crises cannot be ‘solved’ through equi-
librium solutions, while exploring how emergent fragility works across the micro-, meso- and
macroeconomic levels of analysis. Consequently, the assessment of contemporary Minskian
ABMs are guided by how well computational modelling captures the ‘vision’ of Minsky,
along with their pedagogical and experimental capabilities in representing a complex sys-
tem.
The motivation for this stems from the fact that complexity and ABMs must climb
the theoretical mountain of endogenous fragility and crises, which rises much further than
merely presenting an alternative methodology to track the evolution of business cycles. Re-
garding the failure to foresee the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, the ‘dissenting mainstream’
point to wilful ignorance (Romer, 2016), unrealistic microfoundations (Pesaran & Smith,
2011), inherent stability through linearisation (Caiani et al., 2016), and the inability for dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to manage endogenous cycles (Solow,
2010; Stiglitz, 2011). These are not only problems of method. They are the encumbered
result of a simple ontology, with the bounds of the theoretical space defined by axiomatic
general equilibrium. However, it remains unclear whether complexity and computational
modelling can provide lone alternatives due to immense heterogeneity in research agendas,
differing methodologies, and most importantly, a lack of clear theory.
Bringing Minskian theory into dialogue with complexity and agent-based methods there-
fore serves several purposes. The synthesis highlights the congruency between complex
systems analysis and existing heterodox theories, making rich and robust links between
ontology, theory and methodology. It also resolves some problems associated with each
approach. In this thesis, the outstanding issue of Minsky’s work is noted to be the fallacy
of composition. Linear programming and the representative agent are used in Minsky’s
two-price theory of investment, which forms the basis for his ‘financial instability hypoth-
esis’. The fallacy can be resolved though complexity, using network theory and rule-based
analysis to explore the mesoeconomic space between Minskian microfoundations and his
macroeconomics. Conversely, using Minsky’s ideas as a theoretical anchor avoids turning
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complexity into a series of ‘weasel words’, and diminishes the primacy given to positivism by
placing the tools of complexity in a broader narrative. This lens can be employed to assess
contemporary ABMs, of which play a pedagogical role in exploring the processual develop-
ment of economic fragility. The primary problem of computational simulation models is an
underdeveloped ontology, with vague or unspecified assumptions being made about social
reality. As a result, some ABMs have devolved into stylised DSGE models (e.g., Di Guilmi
et al., 2015). The present thesis does not provide a final resolution to these problems, and
it is an open question to how ontological complexity and model parsimony can be rectified.
However, some points of consideration are highlighted by a Minskian complexity theoretic
approach, such as the need to retain nonergodicity and therefore Keynesian uncertainty in
an agent-based framework.
There are few, if any, similarly extensive treatments of a Minskian complexity theory, and
so the current project is orientated toward opening doors to dialogue rather than absolute
resolutions. Note that this thesis does not delve into policy implications nor the role of
institutional governance. ‘Big government’ is an important aspect of Minskian theory (see
Minsky, 1986/2008), but will not be discussed within this thesis due to the limited scope
of the project, and for the sake of brevity. Rather, the current project is exploratory and
theoretical; that is, it traces the theoretical implications of a synthesis and uses complex
systems thinking to build on understanding the drivers of economic fragility.
The thesis does, however, stand on the shoulders of several Post Keynesian theorists
who call for the absorption of complex systems thinking into Post Keynesian Economics
(PKE). Basil Moore (2006) argues that complexity provides a cohesive base for conceptions
of uncertainty and system nonergodicity, turning the heterodox project from convincing the
‘academy’ that an idea or axiom is valid, to one pushing for a recognition that the econ-
omy is a complex system. Rosser Jr (2006: 22-23) argues that complexity theory provides
an ontological and technical through line between the disparate schools of PKE, with the
deepest link being the conception of endogenous aggregate fluctuations. The complexity
literature shares nonequilibrium and reswitching dynamics with the Sraffians, nonlinearities
with the Kaleckians, and nonergodicity for the fundamentalists i.e. Davidsonian and Min-
skian strands (Rosser Jr, 2006, 2010, 2013). Velupillai (2013) suggests the technical insights
of complexity (i.e., nonlinearity, nonmaximum dynamics, and computational modelling)
must be added to the Post Keynesian toolkit to expand the formal robustness of theories
around aggregate fluctuations. Indeed, complexity research into endogenous volatility (e.g.,
Gomes, 2014), nonlinear and ‘irregular’ dynamics (e.g., Day, 1992, 2000) are congruent with
Minskian theories of cyclical fluctuations, and both share a rejection of the general equi-
librium framework (cf. Minsky, 1993a, 1986/2008; Lux & Alfarano, 2016; Farmer, 2012).
It is then no surprise that recent Minskian agent-based models absorb complex systems
thinking through evolutionary adaptation, non-equilibrium analysis, and networking the-
ory. The most direct example is the Minskian agent based-stock flow consistent models of
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Seppecher & Salle (2015) and Seppecher et al. (2016), which can simulate sentiment-driven
endogenous cycles and their impact on multiple sectors of the economy.
Nevertheless, there are some extant issues to be ironed out. What is discarded and
adopted in a Minskian complexity synthesis? What are the specific micro-, meso- and
macroeconomic dynamics that underpin this approach to endogenous cycles? What exactly
replaces equilibrium analysis? Are there any implications for existing ABMs if a complex
ontology is adopted? The current project probes these questions through three distinct
paths divided into chapters, converging as an extended example of one way heterodox and
complexity theories can meaningfully interrogate one another.
Chapter One is an introduction to Minskian and complexity approaches to aggregate
fluctuations, outlining the congruent and incommensurable ideas present in each. The
justification and defence of the proposed synthesis stems from the fact that complexity
applications can successfully retain the underlying vision of Minsky, while adding analytical
depth. The types of complexity are discussed relative to the Minskian framework, namely
‘restricted’ and ‘general’ complexity with respectively refer to system analysis and ontology-
epistemology. Outstanding critiques for both complexity and Minskian approaches are
outlined, with some answers via a synthesis developed in the following chapter.
Chapter Two discusses the micro-meso-macro dynamics of endogenous fluctuations
and volatility under a Minskian complexity theory, forming the technical argument of this
thesis. Here, nonergodicity and Keynesian uncertainty underpin the formation of agent
heuristics, forming the ‘microfoundations’ of the proposed dynamics. At the meso-level,
these decision rules are socially transmitted through a systems architecture, pointing to
the role of market topology in the transmission of speculative behaviour. It is at this
analytical level that dynamics can become paradoxical - rational microeconomic behaviour
can aggregate into collective irrationality (Al-Suwailem, 2014: 393). As an idea borrowed
from the evolutionary complexity approach of Holling (1973), the ‘resilience-stability trade-
off’ is discussed to conceptualise behavioural homogeneity (i.e., herding) as fragility creating.
Chapter Three is a critical investigation of contemporary Minskian ABMs. Although
presenting a formal model is out of the scope of this paper, Minskian models are presented
and assessed relative to the ideas presented in previous chapters. One outstanding problem
of ABMs relates to the calibration methods used, which can be problematic due to the
high dimensionality of computational macro-models. Procedures to resolve this issue is a
point of theoretical divergence, with some Minskian ABMs turning into a stylised DSGE
model via the use of representative agents (e.g., Chiarella & Di Guilmi, 2011). This chapter
argues that the representative agent framework must be discarded entirely if a complexity
lens is employed, and analyses models that successfully do so (e.g., Seppecher & Salle,
2015; Seppecher et al., 2016). To conclude, a sketch of the problems associated with ABMs
are illustrated, leading to a call for increased consideration about the system assumptions
employed in model design.
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Chapter 1
A primer and comparison of Minsky and
complexity
This chapter serves as a primer to Minskian and complexity theories, from the stand-
point that they are complementary frameworks. The central through-line is to present the
opportunity for synthesis through a comparison of theory, methodology and epistemology.
Minsky’s theory of financial fragility is a cohesive diagnosis of crises in an investment-centric
capitalism, using both narrative and formal reasoning to identify why capitalism is marred
by persistent breakdowns. Although complexity approaches are highly varied, some discur-
sive branches are traced, moving from technical (‘restricted’) to philosophical applications
of complex systems thinking. In effect, restricted complexity dealing with evolutionary and
dynamical systems analysis asks how crises unfold, which must be connected with Minsky’s
‘why ’. The call for a synthesis, however, must traverse the problem of choosing what ele-
ments are to be discarded and highlighted in the respective frameworks. Any resolution is
necessarily tentative, as the literature is embryonic, but a preservation of an evolutionary
and transformative ontology is crucial. This chapter outlines some points of consideration
carried through the rest of this project interaction to replace the representative agent,
induction over deduction, and process analysis to usurp equilibrium analysis.
Section 1.1 provides an exploration of Minsky’s central thesis, the financial instability
hypothesis, to illustrate the ideas to be preserved and extended through a Minskian com-
plexity theory. Outstanding critiques of Minsky’s oeuvre are presented, raising questions
about the role of sentiment in speculative investment, an idea expanded upon in Chapter 2.
Section 1.2 introduces relevant concepts from the complexity literature, outlining technical
contributions associated with econobiology and econophysics in understanding endogenous
fluctuations. ‘General’ complexity is also presented as a poststructuralist approach to social
science, highlighting the role of ontology in research. It is posed as a friendly competitor to
the critical realism of Post Keynesian economics (PKE), setting the stage for a discussion
on synthesis in section 1.3. Here, the concluding argument is one that states sensitivity to
the economy as a complex system must be central to the project of heterodox economics.
1.1 The Minskian vision
In discussing a paper on stock market volatility, Minsky (in Friedman et al., 1989: 174-175)
notes that he seeks to explain the cyclical fluctuations observed by Joseph Schumpeter,
Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and Moses Abramovitz. Such explanation is provided by
the financial instability hypothesis, self-described as a ‘deviant interpretation of Keynes’s
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General Theory ’ (Minsky, in Friedman et al., 1989: 175).
The fundamental vision inscribed in the hypothesis is one of inherent evolutionary in-
stability; the survival of an economic actor is dependent on the speculative accumulation
of capital and profits, inducing debt-financed investment today, for uncertain returns to-
morrow. Minsky adopts the methodological individualism of Josef Schumpeter to explore
human agency and its relation to the future. Unlike Schumpeter (1942) who relegates
the agent of change to the creative entrepreneur Minsky turns toward the firm as a force
of cyclical instability. Firms negotiate with equally agential institutions, such as profit-
seeking banks, to establish the terms of the agreement in debt contracts. In the words
of Kuznets (1940: 259), investment is the sui generis function of the business enterprise,
seeding fragility via increasing debt during buoyant macroeconomic conditions, eventually
blooming into a deleveraging crisis.
The progression of this process is by no means short, potentially spanning decades.
Palley (2011) notes that Minsky analyses both medium term (basic) cycles of approximately
one decade in financial fluctuations, and a long-wave (super) cycle akin to the forty to sixty
years1. Financial crisis and depression are most associated with super-cycles, which are a
cumulation of basic-cycles that gradually erode the system.
The decomposition of aggregate fluctuations into super- and basic-cycles is not immedi-
ately apparent in Minsky’s work, reflecting his tendency to commingle analytical levels. He
combines both a medium-term analysis akin to the Neoclassical synthesis and the ‘long cycle
thinking’ of Schumpeter and Kondratieff (Palley, 2011: 2). However, making a distinction
between these two styles of approaching analysis requires ‘reading between the lines’ (ibid.
2). This ambiguity is also present in Minsky’s treatment of micro- and macroeconomics.
Although discussed in more detail in later sections of this chapter, it is useful to note that
the imprecise treatment of analytical levels has led some to critique Minsky as propagating
a fallacy of composition (e.g., Lavoie & Seccareccia, 2001). The mechanistic particulars of
Minsky’s (1986/2008) financial instability hypothesis, namely the two-price theory of invest-
ment, reduces investment strategies to a negotiation between borrower and lender, which
aggregates outward and misses a fundamental meso-level of interaction between agents.
The subjective view of time is illustrated through a compressed analysis of one firm, leaving
intra-firm interaction to an assumed or implicit process. Complexity approaches, such as
that of Moore (2006) and Cilliers (1998), avoid the fallacy by decentering the economic
agent as representative of the collective. From this perspective, the investment decisions
of individuals only cohere to create patterns in the aggregate through multiple networks of
interaction. To make sense of this approach and its methodological consequences, Minskian
and complexity theories must be briefly introduced.
1Long-waves are often described as ‘Kondratieff’ cycles, and were analysed by Schumpeter. See Kon-
dratieff & Stolper (1935) and Kuznets (1940).
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1.1.1 The two-price theory of investment and the financial instability
hypothesis
Underscoring Minsky’s approach is the acceptance that excess volatility and economic crises
are irresolvable problems endemic to capitalism. The traverse to some supposed ‘steady-
state’ holds within it the forces of its undoing, with any tranquil moment being just that a
fleeting moment (Minsky, 1976: 54). Any stabilisation policies that address the symptoms
of a fragile system can, in fact, create an unforeseen trajectory toward the fragility it meant
to diminish.
It is this vision that Minsky (1986/2008: 194) draws upon to put forward two funda-
mental postulates of the financial instability hypothesis:
1. There cannot be a constant stable price full-employment equilibrium under capitalist
markets;
2. The mechanisms necessary for modern capitalist economies are the cause of recurrent,
protracted business cycles and crises.
These statements are reflective of Minsky’s vision of the economy as one of perpetual
internal flux. The foundation of the hypothesis stems from this vision; a sophisticated
financial system influences the macroeconomy via interconnected balance sheet relations,
driven by a collective interest in profit accumulation. Rather than beginning with a profit
maximisation specification of a principle-agent problem, Minsky adopts what Toporowski
(2016: 96) denotes the ‘stock-flow proble´matique’: agents speculate on the income flows
required to secure their stock of capital assets, which necessarily corresponds to the stocks
and flows of interrelated balance sheets over time (Minsky, 1992: 3-4). Balance sheets are
more than a static statement of assets and liabilities they connect past cash-flows, present
decisions, and expectations of the future.
Expectations are forecasts of an uncertain future, and holding money is a form of in-
surance against future contingencies. This characteristic of money is described by Minsky
(1986/2008: 204) as ‘the virtue of liquidity’, drawing from the liquidity preference of Keynes.
Money non-neutrality is the general case, as intertemporal investment and consumption de-
cisions are defined through the subjective expectations of a fundamentally uncertain future.
As balance sheet relations connect time periods through financial obligations, the classical
dichotomy between real and nominal variables becomes of secondary importance. Minsky
(1993a: 6) argues that this division is one of analytical convenience, noting ‘there is no so
called real economy whose behaviour can be studied by abstracting from financial consid-
erations’. Indeed, this is a hint that categorical reduction should not be used in studying
such a ‘complex evolving beast’ as the macroeconomy (Minsky, 1957: 3).
The emergent fragility of the system is dependent on the capital and liability structures
of firms, grounded in the two-price theory of investment (Minsky, 1986/2008: 213-218).
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Here, Minsky evokes the representative firm to illustrate the role of risk perception in de-
termining the level of external financing, represented in Figure 1.1. The two prices are (i)
price of current output (PI), calculated as cost plus markup, and; (ii) the price of capital
assets (PK), found through the intersection between asset supply and demand (Minsky,
1986/2008: 200). Capital asset supply is fixed in the short-run, with demand influenced by
present value calculation of the assets future cash-flows and their liquidity. Similarly, finan-
cial asset i.e. equity, price is determined by expected cash-flow, but without the liquidity
consideration.
Figure 1.1: The determinants of internal finance (I) and external finance (Iˆ) according to
the two-price theory of investment (Minsky, 1986/2008: 213).
These prices enter into the firms net worth, by determining the total monetary and
capital assets available after liability costs have been taken into account. The sum of
monetary assets, e.g. profits and corporate bonds is captured in a firms internal cash-flow
(QN ), and determines level of internal financing used in investment (point A). Beyond
this level, external financing is the result of a negotiation between the borrowing firm and
the profit-seeking lender. The agreeable price of external financing (P ′I) is found via the
intersection between the borrower (PK function) and lender’s cost of risk (PI function),
respectively denoted the demand price and supply price of investment (Minsky, 1986/2008:
214). Bank risk is reflected in terms of the loan, the interest rate and credit amount, or
the risk premium of a financial asset in the case of a public offering. As such, lenders are
characterised as active, profit-seeking actors, rather than passive facilitators.
Minsky largely overlooks the social and psychological aspects of speculative sentiment
of Keynes’s (1936) ‘animal spirits’, but the two-price theory, when aggregated outward, im-
plies that collective bias in risk assessment can create increasing financial fragility. Buoyant
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macroeconomic conditions, characterised by strong aggregate demand, suppress perceived
risk and uncertainty, reducing the virtue of liquidity. If speculation over expected profits
drives an increase in investment under this accommodative environment, there may be an
evolution towards generalised fragility, as more firms take on increased absolute debt. A
small increase in commercial interest rates may impact the terms of repayment of con-
tractually obliged firms, suggesting the nonlinear nature of an endogenous disequilibrium
sequence in a fragile economy. Unfortunately, the interaction between firms is mostly absent
from analysis, negating the influence of contagion-like spread of optimistic or pessimistic
behaviour in the degree to which investment is undertaken. Minsky (1986/2008: 49) does
briefly comment on the role of ‘socialisation’ in speculative risk-taking behaviour, although
for the most part, the agent is framed as introspective, looking inward to balance sheet
calculations and only outward to macroeconomic fundamentals.
Minsky introduces a tripartite heterogeneous agent schema to trace the evolution of
economic robustness to fragility. The efficacy for external finance to be destabilising is
dependent on the financial position of firms, namely their ability to repay the principal and
interest on outstanding debts. Minsky (1992: 6) categorises firms into hedge, speculative,
and Ponzi firms according to this ability. If hedge financiers denominate the financial
system, the majority of firms can repay both principal and interest on the outstanding debt
by drawing on cash flows. The transition toward a fragile system is marked by the rising
rate of speculative financiers, who can fund the required interest repayments, but cannot
meet the principal of the loan. Hedge firms become speculative by expanding externally
financed investment under the expectation that future cash flows will continue to rise.
Consequently, increases in commercial interest rates or a reactionary monetary policy
tightening may reduce the ability to service interest repayments, turning firms into Ponzi
financiers. Fragility is rife when Ponzi financiers dominate the market, meaning most firms
cannot fulfil any of their contractual repayments and must deleverage their position to meet
the required repayment. Minsky (1992: 8) hypothesised that a Ponzi economy would lead to
Fisherian debt deflation due to panic selling, as firms collectively deleverage their position
to avoid bankruptcy.
1.1.2 Outstanding critiques and a sketch of possible resolutions
The picture created by the financial instability hypothesis is one where firms, differentiated
by balance sheet composition, interact with the world through an interpretation of the state
of the macroeconomy, banks and governmental institutions. Banks have agential power
by way of a profit motive, naturalised as a component of their function as risk-assessing
lenders. Much like business enterprises, the risk perception of banks is a product of inferring
insights from macroeconomic fundamentals. However, Minsky’s treatment of evolutionary
financial fragility raises some questions about the conceptualisation of economic actors, and
in particular, how the decision of an individual relates to that of the collective.
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A highly discussed logical inconsistency that echoes this question the is the paradox
of debt (e.g., Lavoie & Seccareccia, 2001; Bellofiore & Halevi, 2011). The paradox was
originally noted by Steindl (1952), and describes the situation wherein economic agents, by
attempting to decrease debt and leverage ratios, collectively increase aggregate indebtedness
by reducing investment and therefore aggregate demand. Turning the paradox around, an
increase in individual debt translates to a total decrease in debt by stimulating aggregate
demand. By taking on external finance, firms boost income and consumption through an
increase in investment, resulting in strong cash flows that can service the outstanding debt.
As a result, the Minskian outcome wherein extending external finance can create aggregate
indebtedness, is nullified.
The cause of this logical inconsistency in the Minskian thesis is sourced by Lavoie &
Seccareccia (2001: 85) to the representative agent. This methodological misstep creates a
fallacy of composition, with the paradox highlighting the fact there is no reason for leverage
ratios to be procyclical as per Minsky’s theory. Although the procyclicality of leverage has
been empirically validated (see Adrian & Shin, 2013), attempting to resolve this paradox
points to the somewhat unclear treatment of speculation and uncertainty.
To illustrate this and motivate the entrance of complexity, consider the following. Debt
contracts are burdens carried across irreversible time. If it assumed that credit creation is
a precondition for bank deposits and debt is fixed in nominal terms, this increase in debt
pushes inflation upward by an expansion in bank balance sheets. External debts decline
in real value, feeding back into to the accumulation of additional liabilities. However, if
firms only calculated decisions according to their current cash-flows, there is no reason to
undertake external financing beyond the current level of demand. It is the speculative as-
sumption that demand will grow that raises indebtedness to precarious levels, opening the
system up to fragility due to the time it takes to validate, potentially long, amortization
schedules. Wages may remain stagnant as a result of cost-minimisation on the part of the
firm, or even decline with higher inflation, creating insufficient aggregate demand as indebt-
edness increases. So, what drives such mass speculation required to create macroeconomic
fragility?
Minsky argues,
Financing is often based upon an assumption “that the existing state of affairs
will continue indefinitely” (Keynes, 1936: 152), but of course this assumption
proves false. During a boom the existing state is the boom with its accompanying
capital gains and asset revaluations. During both a debt-deflation and a stagnant
recession the same conventional assumption of the present always ruling is made;
the guiding wisdom is that debts are to be avoided, for debts lead to disaster.
As a recovery approaches full employment the current generation of economic
soothsayers will proclaim that the business cycle has been banished from the
land and a new era of permanent prosperity has been inaugurated. (Minsky,
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1976: 126).
One critique may be that ‘the existing state’ for firms can either be hedge-like or Ponzi-
like, normalising to zero in the aggregate. However, it is implied that there is some social
transmission of expectations by the ‘soothsayers’ who normalise a state of sentiment. This
idea is undeveloped in Minsky’s instability hypothesis. ‘[W]hirlwinds of optimism and pes-
simism’ are simply assumed to influence the movement of speculative markets and reinforce
overinvestment (Papadimitrou and Wray, in Minsky, 1986/2008: xii). In a later work, Min-
sky (1996: 359-364) does briefly discuss the role heuristic rules as guiding the investment
decisions of boundedly rational firms, but there is a significant threat to relegating the role
of expectational bias to an assumed, ambiguous process. As Velupillai (2013) notes,
The transition from [hedge, speculative and Ponzi] is when “Keynesian uncer-
tainty” kicks into action, although it is not clear, in Minsky’s voluminous writ-
ings - nor in any of those by Minsky scholars - how this is played out by the
interaction. (Velupillai, 2013: 427)
The scope for some clarifications come via complexity approaches to sentiment-driven
endogenous cycles, further addressed in Chapter 2 and 3. One point of note is the framing
of analytical levels in complex systems thinking. The ‘gap’ between individual rationality
and the aggregate collective is the meso-level of interest (Al-Suwailem, 2014: 393); the
mesoeconomy is the space of which normalisation of speculative finance occurs. Broadly
categorised as the localised networks of interaction between agents, the meso-level sup-
ports over-optimistic investment through the socially transmitting speculation, legitimising
sentiment the ‘animal spirits’. Expectational bias and the accumulation of debt can be
stimulated and validated by network connections between firms and financial institutions.
The economy can become ‘locked-in’ toward a path of fragility, with commercial and central
banks facing increasing risk, stifling the ability for prudential tools or interest rate controls
to reduce risk without forcing mass deleveraging and bankruptcies.
1.2 A primer on complexity theory
In taking a momentary step back from these micro-technical details, Minsky’s perspective,
his pre-analytic vision, is outlined as evolutionary and dynamic. The question probed in
his oeuvre is one foundational to the social sciences: ‘How to we connect the behaviour of
an individual to the structure which they exist?’ To Minsky, this connection is primarily
defined through microfounded balance sheet relations which both express, and are expres-
sions of, an investment-driven financial capitalism. The complexity perspective is concerned
with much of the same; in particular, complexity asks how a system is cohered as a non-
trivial sum of its parts, whether that be in terms of historical evolution, multidimensional
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networks, system movement or epistemic understanding itself (c.f. Simon, 1962; Holland,
1992b; Cilliers, 1998).
Restricted and general complexity, first noted by Morin (2007), are used here to roughly
equivalent to system theories and ontology, respectively. Restricted complexity is ‘re-
stricted’, because it sets the epistemic bounds of which theory-building occurs, ‘[acknowl-
edging] the non-linear, relational nature of complex systems, but [seeking] to tame it in ways
which reintroduces positivism and reductionism’ (Cilliers, 2010b: 41). It is further decom-
posed into aggregate and dynamical complexity following the typologies of Manson (2001)
and Rosser Jr (2004), to distinguish between the broadly biological and physical methods
employed. General complexity is an ontological and epistemological project that stresses
the fundamental limits to knowledge in a truly intractable reality (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010).
Under this perspective, the external world is continually changing, and so knowledge of it is
always an incomplete local narrative. Consequently, dualisms associated with the scientific
method are relaxed, e.g., objectivity/subjectivity, real/abstract, holism/atomism (Preiser
& Cilliers, 2010: 268-269).
1.2.1 Restricted complexity
Aggregate complexity
Aggregate complexity is a systems theory of interaction, that suggests the relationship
between units produce aggregate coherence by way of emergent patterns, such as economic
crises. System coherence is not necessarily stable or uniform, with no direct universal control
that governs functionality. Consider the following features of an aggregately complex system
put forward by Cilliers (1998: 8-9):
1. There are many heterogeneous agents who interact, adapt and learn;
2. Spatial and informational constraints bound interaction, e.g., bounded rationality;
3. Information is spread across many agents simultaneously;
4. There are positive and negative feedback loops; and,
5. It is an open system that is regularly out of equilibrium, with unclear division between
exogenous and endogenous variables.
Many of these features are also present within Minsky’s financial instability hypothe-
sis. For example, firms are heterogeneous in liability structures, differentiated into hedge,
speculative and Ponzi financiers. They do not have rational expectations nor perfect infor-
mation, with fundamental uncertainty and risk proper acting as spectres haunting invest-
ment. Additionally, the economy never settles into a fixed-point Walrasian equilibrium to
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any meaningful degree; in fact, the hypothesis is a direct response to the self-equilibrating
tendency espoused in the neoclassical synthesis (Minsky, 1986/2008: 196-199). Minsky does
miss some key points however, namely that of social interaction, learning and the movement
of information across networks.
Applications of aggregate complexity in the study of financial crises, borrow tools from
networking theory and mathematical biology to explore the conditions and results of eco-
nomic crises, often through agent-based modelling (see e.g., Kolb, 2011), further discussed
in Chapter 3. Ideas of biological evolution play a fundamental role in explaining the in-
ternal changes of the economy, spawning the subdiscipline of econobiology. Econobiological
perspectives, such as that of Arthur (1995), frame evolution in markets as one of cognitive
change and learning, with crises representing a culmination of contingent adaptations that
conflict with the broader environment (see also, Zeidan & Richardson, 2010).
Complexity is most potently illustrated by the fact that these individual adaptations
are highly heterogeneous, meaning agent level adaptation does not necessarily aggregate
outward to system-wide adaptability as is usually assumed (Wilson, 2014: 31-32). Complex
systems with many hierarchically organised subsystems may have conflicting responses to
environmental change, leading to an ambiguous or counterintuitive aggregate response. An
example of this is the paradox of risk, which describes the tendency for systemic risk in the
financial system to increase when individuals collectively attempt to reduce risk through
diversification. The paradox of debt as presented by Steindl (1952) is also an example of a
micro-macro conflict where adaptive microeconomic responses are collectively maladaptive.
If adaptations are even across analytical levels, i.e. micro-macro, then secular evolutionary
changes would follow systematic convergence to a stable optimum, as no internal conflict
occurs. By use of the representative agent, Minsky leaves ambiguous the processes of
evolutionary change that work across analytical levels. Recall an earlier point: if firms
are heterogeneous, facing different degrees of profits and losses, there is no a priori reason
for firms to suddenly increase debt financing under the assumption that ‘the existing state
continues indefinitely’, because the existing state may be different for every firm (Keynes,
1936: 152).
Dynamical complexity
Dynamical complexity is concerned with understanding the often irregular movements and
statistical properties of economic systems, using the tools from dynamical physics to analyse
complex systems. Although Rosser Jr (1999: 170-171) argues that the dynamical framework
captures within it the aggregate biological perspective outlined above, the epistemological
orientation is fundamentally different. In dynamical approaches, the research questions
often pertain to whether empirically observed patterns follow an underlying universal law,
or whether it is reducible to some equation(s). As a result, theory and social philosophy
often escapes dynamical discourse (cf. Rosser Jr, 2008).
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Nevertheless, many facets of the Minskian hypothesis are captured via dynamical sys-
tems analysis. Generally speaking, a system is dynamically complex if:
1. Macrodynamics are nonlinear. Nonlinearity is observed when variables have an
output proportionally unequal to their input, such as in the case of a commercial
interest rate change causing mass bankruptcies in a fragile economy. At a systems
level, nonlinearity is also observed through sensitive dependence to initial conditions
(SDIC). If a system exhibits SDIC, infinitesimally small changes in the original spec-
ifications of the system can create extreme divergence in the long-run, compared to
if the change did not occur. SDIC reflects path-dependency, non-forecastability, and
Keynesian non-probabilistic uncertainty: no a priori calculation of path probabilities
can accurately forecast the long-run movement of a complex system unless all the
value of all variables, their behaviour, and the exit and entry patterns are known
exactly.
2. There is no fixed point equilibrium. This non-equilibrium characteristic refers
to system aperiodicity, wherein no stable long-run equilibrium is derivable through a
Brouwer fixed-point theorem (as is used in the general equilibrium theory by Arrow
& Debreu (1954)). It also means there are no aggregate cycles that precisely return
to in its initial state, as minor perturbations accumulate across time, a point shared
by the Minskian hypothesis. A fixed point equilibrium can only occur if the system
or its parameters are constant and non-dynamic.
3. The internal rules of a system change. Endogenous phase switching occurs when
the system equations change in different state spaces or over time (Day, 1992: S9).
For example, Sethi (1996) analyses endogenous regime switching as the way in which
investment strategies change according to market conditions, of which are products of
the strategies themselves. Under the instability hypothesis, endogenous rule changes
are also seen in the feedback processes between the macroeconomy and speculative
investment, changing across different phases of aggregate cycles.
Dynamical complexity is most associated with econophysics, using the methods of sta-
tistical physics, quantum theory and fluid mechanics to untangle the behaviour of complex
systems. The problem with the econophysics literature is that while it is empirically robust
and offers novel methodologies, there are often no theoretical foundations for much of the
research. Primacy is given to robust empirics over any theoretical narrative, with econo-
physics being described as ‘data analysis first and hypothesis formulation second’ (Zeidan
& Richardson, 2010: 3).
Econophysicists like McCauley (2006, 2009) believe they are subverting mainstream
thought, with radically new insights into market processes. McCauley (2009: 201, 204)
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finds that the subjective value of asset prices imbued in speculative markets lead to en-
dogenous fragility, and argues that long-run equilibrium solutions are irrelevant. These are
ideas commonly associated with Minsky and Sraffa, and even a brief foray into heterodox
economics would have revealed this to be the case. Yet, McCauley (2006: 607) argues,
‘[n]o existing economic model or idea provides us with a zeroth order starting point for
understanding how real markets function.’
This is not to downplay the insights provided by dynamical approaches. There have
been attempts to formalise Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis using methods found
in physics (e.g., Assenza et al., 2010; Delli Gatti, 2012), as his theories are not easily
translatable into standard economics and econometrics:
The nice equilibrium solution that economists have been trained to seek does
not exist. The modelling leads to complex non-linear time-dependent relations
which, as attempts to model and solve or simulate these ideas has shown, lead
to complex time series which exhibit what can be considered periods of chaotic
behaviour. (Minsky, 1993b: 34)
Much of the research in econophysics supports the Minskian hypothesis. The endo-
geneity of cycles is traced to the composition of speculative behaviour in financial mar-
kets (Zeeman, 1977; Cobb, 1980; Rheinlaender & Steinkamp, 2004), mirroring the hedge-
speculative-Ponzi schema of Minsky. Furthermore, there have been successes in accepting
the persistence of excess volatility and crises in the dynamical literature. A famous example
of this comes from the father of econophysics, Benoit Mandelbrot (1963) who found that
asset returns were not normally (Gaussian) distributed, and instead were characterised
by ‘fat-tails’ that suggest the regularity of financial instability. The assumption of nor-
mality was employed since Bachelier (1900), and can be seen in Modern Portfolio Theory
(Markowitz, 1952) and early versions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964).
These insights into stylised facts have also been subsumed into mainstream discourse, for
example via contemporary versions of the Black-Scholes model, which appears odd con-
sidering the supposed rejection of mainstream economics within econophysics. The reason
for this is simple, however: it is because there is no theory behind the tools, and without
theory, these insights become descriptions.
1.2.2 General complexity
Contrary to econophysics, general complexity is a philosophical position that supposes the
impossibility of permanent universal knowledge, an approach primarily developed by Cilliers
(1998, 2005) through a lens tinted with poststructuralist colours. A useful entry point is
to compare this approach to the critical realism of Lawson (1999, 2006), who argued that
PKE and heterodox economics more generally, must be poised on an ontology of open-
systems. Dow (2002: 173) points out that critical realism closely aligns to the logic of
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Keynes (1921), devoted to understanding objective causal processes without imputing the
necessity of establishing causal laws. As such, a critical realist ontology supposes a social
reality in continual flux, with ‘relational emergence’ that cannot be reduced into axiomatic
formations (Elder-Vass, 2010: 67).
General complexity and critical realism are ontologically similar, both rejecting the pre-
tence put forward by the mainstream that social reality is compressible into a series of func-
tions. Indeed, this implicates restricted complexity insofar as the econophysics paradigm
attempts to re-inject positivism into the study of complex systems, with criticisms from
Horgan (2004) arguing that complexity approaches aim to find ‘truths’ under an ontology
that refutes the possibility of ‘truth’ at all.
It thus follows there are two questions to answer, ‘does general complexity offer anything
different to critical realism?’ and, ‘can the theories of restricted complexity be rectified with
the general?’. The answer to both is ‘yes’, and for the same reason: general complexity
posits the inseparability of the observer and the observed. The epistemological consequence
is one that accepts that any identified causal process is a partial representation of the world,
whether it by via narrative reasoning or formal logic. Social reality is so complex that it can
never be understood through absolute holism, as any analysis is motivated by the normative
and ethical principles of the observer. Theory is performative, and knowledge does not exist
in an objective/subjective dualism. It is an expression of a ‘local narrative’ which cannot be
measured in truth value when compared with an external social reality that is necessarily
cohered experientially (Moore, 2006: 69).
This is not to say complex systems are purely stochastic or unstructured. Following the
arguments of Cilliers (2010a: 8) and Dow (2004), for a system to be operational, it must
have structure, even if there is some constant change. Similarly, any theory addressing
a system must be closed, by placing boundaries on what is analysed and ignored. Social
reality may be open, but attempting to approach it as such is impossible.
General complexity posits sensitivity toward the difference between theory and ontol-
ogy while empowering the normative dimension, a point often unaddressed by positivist
extensions of restricted complexity. Critical realism gives primacy to uncovering the pro-
cesses of an objective and complex reality - but as Kaul (2002: 714) notes, this requires
that some theories, or representations of the world, be more ‘real’ than others, even if such
property is transient. General complexity on the other hand, does not necessarily reject
that there exists an external world but rather shifts the focus toward how understanding
(a ‘complex epistemology’) co-produces ontology (Preiser & Cilliers, 2010: 267) via a social
philosophy. Returning to the Minskian hypothesis makes this point clear. One interpreta-
tion, the critical realist position, may be that the financial instability hypothesis is a theory
of processes that usurps the mainstream conception of cyclical fluctuations as exogenously
triggered, by presenting a theory that is more aligned to social reality. This is how Minsky
(1986/2008) himself partially justifies the financial instability hypothesis, as one orthogonal
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to the neoclassical synthesis, adopting dialectical historical time and uncertainty as ontolog-
ical precepts. It is not, however, an exploratory foray to find the true ‘causal mechanisms
and generative structures’ as is required by critical realism (Austen & Jefferson, 2006: 259).
Instead, general complexity suggests it is the framing of reality that matters. Ideology
and ontology co-produce one another, shaping the questions asked and the methods of
approaching the problems. Minsky provides a critical diagnosis of capitalism, a political
and ethical position for reform, inseparable from the analysis itself:
Although [Stabilizing an Unstable Economy ] is mainly concerned with economic
theory and some interpretive economic history, its aim is to draw up an agenda
for the reform of our malfunctioning economy. Effective reforms must be con-
sistent with the processes of the economy and not violate the character of the
people. Without an understanding of the economic process, and without a pas-
sionate, even irrational commitment to democratic ideals, an agenda for change,
in response to a perceived need for change, can become the instrument of dema-
gogues who play on fears and frustrations and offer panaceas and empty slogans.
(Minsky, 1986/2008: 10).
In sum, the ontology of general complexity and critical realism are very similar, fo-
cusing on open-systems, emergence and dynamical movement. The point of difference is
meta-methodological; that is, there is increased sensitivity to the inherent incompleteness
of knowledge in attempting to understand a complex system2. As such, the ontological
and theoretical distinction must remain clear. Formal representations, which are necessar-
ily simplified snapshots of complexity, should not be presented as the reality, but merely
attempts to approach a reality in a particular way.
1.3 On the purpose of a synthesis
The elements of a synthesis have been outlined, albeit in a manner that is scattered and
multidirectional. The Minskian hypothesis presents a theory of financial capitalism that
digs into the mechanistic particulars, aligning with the ontology of a complex, evolutionary
system. The fallacy of composition is addressed by aggregate complexity, with dynamical
approaches providing a positivist extension of Minsky’s theory. Underscoring this is general
complexity, a philosophical framework that highlights pluralism and ethics in broaching the
problem of systemic crises.
Before embarking on an applied synthesis in Chapter 2, some questions must be briefly
addressed. The core issues that any synthesis must tackle relates to how and why a synthesis
is a meaningful intervention. What are the merits? Are there criteria for achieving a
2A rejoinder to this may be that general complexity is liable to relativism. It is not addressed here, but
Moore (2006) and Cilliers (2010a) provide a response.
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successful synthesis? These questions will find no final answer here, but the guiding pretence
for the following chapters is one that argues that complexity, in both general and restricted
forms, can be meaningfully absorbed into heterodox discourse, retaining the ‘richness’ of
critical thought while being formally robust.
Components of a complex ontology already exist within heterodox economics and po-
litical economy more generally. As Lavoie (2014: 16) notes, heterodox approaches adopt
a systems view over the atomicity of the representative agent in mainstream frameworks,
signalling a belief that reductionism abstracts away from the connections, interactions and
dynamism that characterise social reality. A point of connection between the different types
of complexity and the project of political economy is the decentering of a homo economicus
as a self-interested, unitary being; that is, an agent has a context and history embedded in
their behaviour, and that behaviour is only a minor part of system movement. Furthermore,
general complexity provides an ontological base similar to the existing critical realism of
PKE, but it clarifies some ambiguous terms (e.g., ‘emergence’, ‘evolution’) apparent in the
latter through grounded, restricted processes translatable into formal ABMs and empirics.
While there is no universal criterion for a synthesis between theories, one measure is the
degree of which there is a preservation or commensurability of ontology. The contention
here is that the Minskian vision is already complex, but that complexity is implicit. The
capitalist system in question is structured by agential firms, households and institutions
that interact through financial and monetary spheres. These are networks of interaction
at a meso-level of analysis, that produce cyclical fluctuations irreducible to any one agent.
Fundamental Keynesian uncertainty is pervasive, partially expressed through the subjective
value of risk imbued in debt contracts and the virtue of liquidity. The system is dynamically
uncertain, feeding back into agent expectations. Individuals are boundedly rational, and the
imperative for capital and profit accumulation opens up the possibility for emergent crisis
through debt-financed investment. There is no permanent resolution nor equilibrium point
to this system; it is nonlinear, dynamic and evolutionary, and so long as investment is a
necessary component of a decentralised economy, crises will occur. The project of complexity
allows a probing of these nonlinearities, dynamical and evolutionary characteristics, and
consequently, addresses the outstanding problems associated with Minsky’s theories.
1.4 Conclusion: Filling the gaps
Minsky’s ontology, like many other Post Keynesian economists, is founded upon a vision
of an open system comprised of a capitalist monetary economy. Minsky’s oeuvre is largely
concerned with endogenous cyclical fluctuations arising within financial markets, which
works through the evolution of debt obligations in firm financing. Similarly, applications of
financial complexity theory posit the significance of endogenous volatility, and attempt to
pin-down explanatory causes by looking at agent networks, emergent macrostructures and
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system dynamics.
The Minskian hypothesis is faced with the fallacy of composition, missing a crucial level
of analysis between the microeconomics of investment, and the macroeconomic fragility
that can result. Complexity research on the other hand, has the reversed problem of lax
theoretical foundations with robust methodologies. Bringing these frameworks together
alleviates these extant issues by forcing a reconsideration of some assumed processes, such
as the dynamics of agent adaptation, speculation and equilibrium analysis.
24
Chapter 2
Micro-meso-macro in a Minskian complex-
ity theory
The present chapter is an applied synthesis and demonstrates how overt positivism does
not have to be the fate of complexity research. Networking theory and dynamical systems
theory can be treated as extensions of a Minskian study of aggregate cycles, providing a
fresh perspective on uncertainty, speculation and risk proper. Here, the focus shifts from
theoretical consequences, to a detailing of micro-, meso- and macroeconomic dynamics under
a Minskian complexity theory. Significant attention is paid to developing the meso-level,
the analytical level between the decisions of an individual firm and the aggregate economy.
The meso-level is characterised by network interactions, and can build on the existing ideas
of Minsky through the insights of network theory. To do this, the assumption of system
nonergodicity is explored and translated into a decision rule-based analysis.
Section 2.1 details the complex system assumptions employed in analysis, particularly
around the role of system ergodicity in conceptualising Keynesian uncertainty. This allows
a movement toward rule-based analysis as a method of tracing endogenous cycles to the
behaviour of agents. Section 2.2 explores this avenue at the mesoeconomic level, demon-
strating the role of social transmission and system architecture in the emergence of financial
fragility. Inter-banking and firm networks are discussed to illustrate how risk and sentiment
can spread through mesoeconomic architecture. Finally, Section 2.3 steps back to connect
these principles to the macroeconomy, connecting the Minskian patterns of stability-fragility
to the dynamical principle of a resilience-stability trade-off.
2.1 System assumptions and microeconomic principles
The use of microfoundations is a controversial point within heterodox economics, with Chick
(2016: 99) noting that many heterodox theorists are suspicious of the orthodox tendency to
base macro-analysis on microeconomics. Microeconomic axioms like the assumption of tran-
sitive preferences and convex production functions do not have a role in macroeconomics,
but are used within principle-agent problems to proxy complex interaction (e.g., Kydland
& Prescott, 1982; Smets & Wouters, 2003). The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu and Arrow’s
impossibility theorem are examples of aggregate intractability that arises from basic mi-
croeconomic principles, but these are side-stepped by assuming rational expectations of a
unitary representative agent.
Under a complexity approach, specifically aggregate complexity and agent-based mod-
elling, microfoundations are necessary for explaining emergent phenomena. It is a method-
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ological individualist framework that is distinct from the microfoundations of orthodox eco-
nomics; the microfoundations of complexity are mutable, decentred, and not constrained
to equilibrium conditions. As such, a more suitable descriptor may be to use the term
‘microspecifications’ from the agent-based literature (Adamatti, 2014: 89). The thorny is-
sue of this conception of the micro-level is that the interaction between agents themselves
may produce qualitatively different macrostructures, as a collective action can create a
macroeconomic effect irreducible to the behaviour of one agent, e.g., the paradox of debt.
As Chick (2016) argues,
The unsuitability of ‘rational choice’ theory to a macroeconomics based on un-
certainty does not mean that micro-decision-making should be dismissed as irrel-
evant to macroeconomics it just has to be a microeconomics based on different
principles. (Chick, 2016: 110)
So what microeconomic principles should underpin a Minskian complexity theory?
Toporowski (2006: 4) notes that this is a fundamental question to Minsky’s own analy-
sis, which attempted to found a theory of aggregate cycles on microfoundations independent
of parametric changes. In other words, the microeconomics embedded in the instability hy-
pothesis via the two-price theory of investment are constant across macroeconomic fluctua-
tions, because the processes of interest are chiefly those intrinsic to capitalist structuration.
It follows that a Minskian complexity framework requires microspecifications to flow from
fundamental system characteristics. Microeconomic principles such as bounded rationality,
heterogeneous agents, and the virtue of liquidity fall from the common precipice of sys-
tem nonergodicity. The bridge between nonergodicity and these microspecifications comes
through Keynesian uncertainty, as a nonergodic world is one that is uncertain in such a way
that is unquantifiable, unlike risk proper.
2.1.1 The importance of the ergodic and nonergodic distinction
The ergodic axiom in orthodox economics ensures that there exists a steady-state equilib-
rium. Both ergodic and nonergodic processes are stochastic, but the former states that
‘history does not really matter’ (Dahms & Hazelrigg, 2012: 8). An ergodic system traverses
along a path that is statistically representative of its constituent ‘micro-states’, akin to
the law of large numbers (Auyang, 1999: 98). As a result, the trajectory of an ergodic
system is not constrained by the motion of its component states, as both are statistically
representative of one another. Birkhoff (1913, 1931) contributed the first ergodic theorem,
which was built on by Neumann (1932) and introduced into economics through Samuelson
(1948). This lead to equilibrium analysis being the norm, solidifying the standard use of
linear programming in modelling, as ergodicity is congruent with the marginalist method
of first-order approximations.
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Alternatively, if a system or process is nonergodic, the trajectory is dependent on the
movement of the micro-states, and so captures within it the sensitive dependence on initial
conditions (SDIC) of dynamically complex systems. As such, there is path-dependency
and ‘history matters’ (Dahms & Hazelrigg, 2012: 8). Complex socio-economic systems
are often framed as nonergodic (e.g., Moore, 2006; Dahms & Hazelrigg, 2012; Davidson,
2005). The technical consequences of system nonergodicity mean that common simplifying
mathematical tools cannot be used, such as the central limit theorem (CLT). The CLT
requires that sample data be representative of the actual underlying population, according
to the law of large numbers. Additionally, the second moment (variance) must be finite, to
constrain the values to some range. However, if the system is nonergodic, the underlying
population data may in fact be characterised by infinite variance, giving scope for statistical
discrepancies between population and sample data.
Whether the underlying system is characterised as nonergodic or ergodic has significant
consequences for theory. For example, the Efficient Market Hypothesis assumes that mar-
kets can be described as a stationary ergodic (Brownian motion) process, which translates
into the assumption that asset prices are stochastic and independent of time. Because such
processes are normally (Gaussian) distributed, the CLT can be employed. These assump-
tions are the basis for the no-arbitrage axiom required in financial market equilibrium; the
condition that no exploitable price discrepancies exist between assets. To reach this no-
arbitrage equilibrium, agents must be rational and profit maximising so that any pricing
errors get instantaneously fixed. In other words, there is no uncertainty, or at minimum,
any uncertainty is transient. If this is true, the only sources of price volatility are stochastic
exogenous shocks or changes in market fundamentals - both of which are independent of
the underlying ergodic process.
Conversely, a nonergodic view of financial markets suggests the continual presence of
non-probabilistic uncertainty, as processes are historical, cumulatively changing over time.
Pricing errors or shocks can have perverse impacts, instead of being instantaneously re-
solved. For instance, a collection of arbitrageurs attempting to smooth out any endogenous
or exogenous shocks, buy (sell) when the price is low (high). Since the shock and subse-
quent actions affect all future returns, the arbitrageurs have created a cascade of events
that they can never ‘catch up’ to, and instead inadvertently increase overall volatility in the
long run (Mirowski, 1990: 297). Resultant is the fact that, ‘one cannot accurately predict
future behavior [sic] on the basis of past observed distributions’ (Moore, 2006: xxv). In the
Minskian instability hypothesis, the idea of nonergodicity is present in the framing of the
traverse toward an economic stability - the forces of movement toward any given point hold
forces of destabilisation, with uncertain contingent events accumulating over time (Minsky,
1986/2008: 197).
27
2.1.2 Keynesian uncertainty
Nonergodicity is the foundation for Keynesian uncertainty as presented by Keynes (1921,
1936), and relates to the fact that forecasts of the future state of the world are not com-
pressible into a series of probabilities. Since probabilities are directly related to the evidence
presented, an infinite range of probabilities about a single proposition can exist at the same
time Keynes (1921: 2, 7). Keynes (1921: 30) suggests that the probability of some event
occurring changes due to the arrival of new evidence or the general unfolding of history.
The prior probability still exists as it forms from a set of knowledge and evidence that is
independent of the new set. This is to say that knowledge about a proposition does not
secularly increase in certainty over time if the outcome of that event or statement is not
decomposable into a series of probabilities of ‘objective chance’, e.g., a roulette wheel is not
‘uncertain’ (Keynes, 1921: 477).
The manner in which individuals manage this fundamental uncertainty is highly dif-
ferentiated, as each vision is influenced by an individual’s unique subjective beliefs and
experiences. Keynes (1921: Ch2, 3) discusses ‘degrees of rational belief’ as forms of subjec-
tive probabilities influenced by an individual’s own heuristic rules gained from experience
and thought, as well as external influences such as authoritative and institutional advice.
Decisions are unlikely to be purely rational in the sense of being objectively correct. Knowl-
edge is limited, and the sense of certainty around a proposition is primarily determined in
relation to other propositions, all with varying degrees of subjective evidence - a notion as-
sociated with bounded rationality, an idea by Simon (1957, 1982) and extended by Sargent
et al. (1993).
Minsky (1996: 361) points out that Keynesian uncertainty and bounded rationality are
distinct however, and although the latter can extend from the first, it does not mean they
are synonymous. Bounded rationality denotes the cognitively limited, but often sufficient,
rules used to untangle a complex reality which may not be uncertain in the Keynesian sense.
In fact, bounded rationality by way of information asymmetries has been adopted into the
Knightian framework of orthodox economics. Under Knightian uncertainty, the difference
between uncertainty and risk proper is differentiated, but involves a processual removal of
uncertainties i.e., Bayesian learning. Here, forecasts tend toward the correct belief over
time.
In The General Theory, Keynes (1936) turns to the role of uncertainty in financial
markets. Uncertainty is non-numerical ambiguity of the future, which cannot be ascribed
to a simple probability or risk calculation, because it often deals with subjective conjecture
about things that cannot be known or the future path of an infinite number of variables. In
this way, this form of uncertainty is completely independent of risk proper, with the latter
being quantifiable, thus insurable, whilst the former is not. The famous example of the
beauty contest illustrates this mode of thought Keynes (1936):
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[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole;
so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds
prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other
competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of
view. (Keynes, 1936: 156)
Keynes conceptualises investment behaviour as a guessing game, wherein choice to invest
in stock is uncertain, dependent on predicting what other (uncertain) investors will do.
Under this type of uncertainty, how to individuals form coherent expectations?
Within a Minskian complexity theory, Keynesian uncertainty can be thought of as shap-
ing the individual decisions of investing agents. Along with the cash-flow considerations that
determine the pace of external investment, the management of fundamental unsureness over
the future requires behavioural rules to guide the decision-making process. As Axtell et al.
(2016: 80) note, theorising around behaviour rules is a non-trivial undertaking, as the es-
sential object is how agents, who have limited knowledge, learn from other agents whom
also have incomplete information.
Further, system nonergodicity means that any outcome of a decision rule changes the
macroeconomic path, akin to the sensitivity to initial conditions (SDIC) of dynamical com-
plexity. As a result of Keynesian uncertainty, Walrasian equilibrium analysis becomes un-
tenable, as the traverse towards some steady-state can itself hold forces that disrupt the
macroeconomic trajectory (Minsky, 1976: 59).
2.1.3 Decision rules
In a clarification for The General Theory, (Keynes, 1937: 214-215) presents the ways ‘we
manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which saves our faces as rational,
economic [people]’:
1. The frequentist rule: We follow a frequentist approach to forecasting the uncertain,
basing predictions on the past that may have no relation to the prediction in question;
2. The introspective rule: We assume that the present state of the world is the same
as that of the future; and,
3. The conventional judgement rule: We use the wisdom of the crowd, using the
average or majority of total opinion as a guide.
All of these psychological devices are heuristic rules or ‘rules of thumb’, employed by
individuals in the decision-making process. Although Minsky did not discuss at length
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the significance of these rules, it is alluded to within the instability hypothesis. Minsky
(1996: 361) argues that if mounting evidence against the viability of a decision rule becomes
widespread, many agents can switch behaviours and create a sudden macroeconomic change.
Furthermore, decision rules play a role in the two-price theory of investment, primarily
entering via the subjective value of liquidity. In Minsky’s original form, the supply and
demand price of investment is respectively found via current output price (markup over
cost) and the price of capital and financial assets. Capital assets are valued according to
realised cash flows, carrying costs, and the liquidity premium, the last of which relates to the
feasibility of turning the asset into paper money. The liquidity premium connects capital and
financial assets through the subjective value of money, as the insurance property of money
or near-monies determines the willingness to hold an asset. There is thus an inherently
speculative dimension embedded in the choice to forgo money today for future expected
cash-flow, which requires the adoption of a decision rule that assesses the value of money.
In this sense, a shared valuation of the liquidity of financial and capital assets forms the
basis of investment, implying there is a switch between introspective rules and conventional
judgement along an aggregate cycle. To illustrate this, consider the scenario in which a
firm seeks finance to extend production during buoyant macroeconomic conditions. Per the
two-price theory, the firm mobilises existing cash-flows to internally finance, implying an
introspective decision rule that is either rooted in historical performance or the assumption
that the current heightened demand will continue indefinitely. Externally financing beyond
this level requires the firm to face increased uncertainty, as the firm will be indebted to a
lender for an extended period. As a result, the firm may draw on conventional judgement
(e.g., majority opinion), motivating firms to move from a hedge to speculative position. Sta-
ble or expansionary macroeconomic conditions spur on a collective devaluation of money,
as the fear of unexpected contingencies thus the virtue of liquidity declines, further pushing
toward a Ponzi-dominated market. Inflation is, therefore, one of the markers of an over-
heating economy. In times of crisis, this process is reversed in a Fisherian debt-deflation,
where households and Ponzi firms undertake ‘distress selling’ of capital and financial assets
(Fisher, 1933: 342), corresponding to a sudden increase in the virtue of liquidity.
Nevertheless, there remain some outstanding questions. How does the strategic switch
between hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance occur? Are these strategies socially trans-
mitted? Furthermore, what are the conditions that support or diminish the spread of
fragility-inducing decision rules?
2.2 Mesoeconomic principles
Under a complexity lens, the dynamics of decision rules are principally expressed at a
mesoeconomic level, the mediating space of network interaction between the microeconomics
of a single agent, and the aggregate economy. The meso-level can be characterised by a set
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of hierarchically organised abstract rules, which gain coherence by relation to other rules:
A system that is definably ‘economic’ in nature is reliant upon a structure of rules
that are economic, i.e. that relate to the production and consumption of goods
and services. However, economic rules are, necessarily, embedded in a broader
environment of rules - variously physical, biological, cognitive, behavioural, so-
cial, ecological, legal, political, and so forth. [...] This simple observation goes
some way to explaining why economic systems tend to be fantastically complex
systems, and why evolution, rather than ‘rational intention’, is the principle
source of transformational change and development. (Dopfer et al., 2004: 266)
This is to say that mesoeconomics avoids the fallacy of composition by focusing on a
rule-based analysis, which attempts to explain system evolution as a result of endogenous
rule changes. The ‘meso-trajectory’ of Dopfer et al. (2004: 271) is presented as a way to
conceptualise this evolution, which traces the movement of a rule in a population. Social
transmission via decision rules is one of the important vehicles of behavioural change within
a decentralised capitalist market, and one way of conceptualising the ‘animal spirits’ of
speculative investment.
2.2.1 Social transmission and animal spirits
Social networks transmit decision rules, determining their emergence, diffusion and reten-
tion across a relational space. The architecture of this space, or the network topology, is
then a significant source of endogenous volatility, playing a role in aggregate fluctuations
by structuring the social determinants of investment decisions. For instance, the role of
interpersonal relationships on investment strategies is heavily documented, with research
often adopting network analysis to track the social transmission of information (see e.g.,
Scott, 1991; Shiller, 1995; Panchenko et al., 2013). This approach may ground the notion
of ‘animal spirits’, the speculative optimism and pessimism in markets that lead to self-
fulfilling outcomes. Indeed, De Grauwe (2011) and De Grauwe & Macchiarelli (2015) use
an agent-based model to demonstrate the role of animal spirits in the propagation of cyclical
fluctuations, which is formally specified as a dynamically complex endogenous rule change
in investment behaviours.
Dopfer et al. (2004: 356) argue that explanations for behavioural contagion and spec-
ulative herding can arise due to decision rule cascades, which suggests that movement of
economic rules across social networks are not stochastic, but determined by the position
of an agent in a topological social space. The strength of animal spirits is a product of
its structural context, with the influence of any emergent decision rule dependent on the
relationships of the first-adopter(s). A decision rule cascade is a type of meso-trajectory
that traces the ‘entropic degradation’ of rules, producing aggregate cycles due to lags in
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social transmission (Dopfer et al., 2004: 352, 353). For example, an investing agent may
see a profit opportunity in a company, and purchases stocks under optimistic expectations.
Other agents imitate this strategy and begin buying the financial assets in that particular
industry. Entrepreneurial individuals, seeing a profit opportunity, gradually create new
firms under the belief that aggregate demand is high. This over-saturates the market and
creates a bubble-like situation with inflated financial assets. The influential first-adopter,
as an experienced investor, sells their assets and retains a profit, while those who are at
the bottom end of the cascade face sufficient losses due to lags in social transmission. This
process can explain volatility clustering or ‘hot spots’ of speculative interest, even when it
would be ‘irrational’ according to fundamentals analysis (Earl et al., 2007: 359-360).
2.2.2 The network architecture of banks and firms
An agent’s choice to invest and bear more debt is reduced by Minsky (in Friedman et
al., 1989: 178) to time-dependent introspection about past, current and future liability
structures. In other words, agents exist within a historical context that cannot be divorced
from the decision rules they adopt. The way in which Minsky illustrates this socio-historical
context is through interconnected balance sheet relations, which connect both agents with
themselves through time, as well as other agents along a network.
Networks constitute the meso-structure of the financial system, where the characteristics
of individual agents and institutions are cohered through bounded interaction. Bounded
rationality and a risk-averse decision rules only make sense if it is specified that the agent
exists within a network with an upper bound on the range of influence. Similarly, any
change in the liability structure of a firm must correspond to change somewhere else, i.e. a
firm’s on-take of bank-financed investment appears as an asset on the bank’s balance sheet.
It then follows that the particular structure of interaction informs the extent to which
endogenous fragility can arise. In a way, network structure, or topology, has always been
a concern of political economy for this reason. Do markets tend towards a competitive
outcome with low volatility when laissez-faire governance is followed? Alternatively, does
the structure of capitalist relations tend to mutate markets into monopolies that require
strong government intervention? Minsky (1986/2008: 355) argues in terms of the latter,
and in particular, discusses the importance of a decentralised banking network in fostering
finance to small-medium business enterprises.
Banks are agential profit-seeking institutions. If they are allowed to be oligopolistic,
banks may choose to privilege finance to large corporations, in the pursuit for secured wealth
(Minsky, 1986/2008: 355). The possibility of this was realised through the Riegle-Neal Act
of 1994, which allowed banks to expand operations across state borders within the United
States. The act was partially justified on the probability calculation that a centralised
banking system, akin to an oligopolistic market structure, increased system robustness
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against systemic risk (see Akhigbe & Whyte, 2003). Larger banks can efficiently absorb
perturbations that smaller banks cannot. Similarly, idiosyncratic risks can be diversified
across branches in different geographic locations, lowering the exposure to potential fragility.
Generally speaking, the interbank configuration allowed by the Riegle-Neal Act is a
disassortative scale-free system: a few large banks are connected to a range of smaller firms
and institutions, the latter group being less connected to one another, compared with the
large banking hubs. Regarding networking topology, each agent is represented as a ‘node’
in the network, with relationships denoted via ‘links’. Each node has a number of links,
called its ‘degree’, with a ‘degree distribution’ being the aggregate probability distribution
of degrees. A scale-free system is characterised by a degree distribution that is power law
distributed, which implies high inequality between node degrees (see Ozkan-Canbolat &
Beraha, 2016).
Contrary to the basis of the Riegle-Neal Act, the Financial Crisis demonstrated that
failure of the large hubs can create a near-absolute cascade of system breakdown. Although
the disassortative interbank network has a lower chance of spreading illiquidity risk from
the smaller less connected nodes, an illiquidity crisis in an oligopolistic bank with a large
degree can amplify crisis effects, due to its connectivity. This is a resilience-stability trade-off
apparent in the interbank network, also known as the trade-off between the ability to ‘load
redistribute’ through risk diversification, while creating a contagion of risk. As Roukny
et al. (2013) argue, this may imply that disassortative scale-free banking networks may
not have any more protection against crisis and fragility than a decentralised competitive
network; that is, a network with many small nodes, connected relatively evenly via links.
Within the Minskian framework, a corporate bank is a profit-seeking institution that
actively shapes the terms of financing through risk considerations. If it is believed that load
redistribution reduces idiosyncratic risk and provides a buffer to systemic risk, the bank may
choose to lower the criteria for firms and institutions, especially during an expansionary or
tranquil phase. A large bank may choose to privilege lines of credit to similarly large firms,
as monopolistic or oligopolistic corporations have high cash flows, and can hypothecate
more assets.
Returning to firm networks, firm sizes are characterised by a power (Zipf) law with
exponent equal 1 (Axtell, 2001). This power law distribution means that large monopolistic
firms tend to grow faster than small firms, having a disproportionate share in national
aggregates (Gualdi & Mandel, 2016: 2). Although an intuitive result, it suggests that firm
size distribution is not governed by a stochastic growth process which, if it were, would
result in a (long assumed) lognormal distribution (Axtell, 2001: 1818). It also means that
minor endogenous or exogenous perturbations can cascade to create instability, if the shocks
occur within the monopolistic hubs. Consequently, a network of smaller competitive firms
are sufficiently more robust against economic instability and exogenous shocks.
Gabaix et al. (2006) suggest that a Zipf distributed firm population can create endoge-
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nous volatility through the trades of large institutional firms and can explain the stylised
fact that asset prices follow a power law of exponent equal 3. If there is something of a cubic
law of absolute returns (|ret|) following the form Pr(|ret| > x) = kx−3, where k represents
an unremarkable constant, it means that the probability of an extreme event, i.e. financial
crisis, falling 10 and 20 standard deviations from the mean is respectively 53 = 125 and
103 = 1000 less likely than a two standard deviation event (Gabaix, 2016: 190). Comparing
this with the Gaussian distribution, which would suggest that it is 1022 and 1087 times less
likely, the existence of a cubic law suggests events such as bubbles and crashes may not
simply be outliers, but closer to the norm (ibid. 190).
Gabaix et al. (2006) hypothesise that market illiquidity causes large firms to deleverage,
which due to their size, cause stock market crashes. In the instability hypothesis, market
illiquidity may be created by a speculative boom, which stymies liquidity through balance
sheet and portfolio changes, such as the acquisition of debt financing or assets. Minsky
(1970: 27) suggests that within illiquid markets, sudden increase in liquidity preference
corresponds to a rapid decline in confidence, leading to a Fisherian debt deflation. As firms
are Zipf distributed, this means that a few or even a single monopolistic investor(s) can
trigger a severe decline in asset price in a fragile system, which also absorbs the notion of
a decision rule cascade arising from an influential agent.
An obvious parallel here can be drawn from the beginnings of the Financial Crisis, which
was marked by the bailout of two hedge funds owned by the investment bank Bear Stearns
in June 2007. The funds traded with relatively new financial derivative products in the
shadow banking sector, collateralised debt obligations. Considering the Ponzi-like position
of Bear Stearns, selling the collateral was the only way to recover liquidity. The act of selling
itself caused a sudden cascade of deleveraging, even though only a minority of the collateral
was sold. This nonlinear impact may be traced to the size and reputable influence of Bear
Stearns (Ryback, 2009: 3) and the existing fragile state of the U.S economy. Because the
derivatives themselves are complex through layered bundling and securitisation, pinning
down the source of risk was impossible, leading to a ‘relentless landslide’ (Bellofiore &
Halevi, 2011: 8).
2.3 Macroeconomic principles through the resilience-stability
trade-off
The trade-off between system stability and resilience is an idea borrowed from dynamical
theories of ecological change, which states that increased biological diversity (i.e. hetero-
geneity in population and environmental conditions) can dually raise volatility and resilience
(Holling, 1973). Dai et al. (2012: 1175) note that diminished volatility in ecological systems
is a marker of potential collapse, particularly around the length of time required for a system
to return to its steady-state. As the system reaches the point of crisis (the tipping point),
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the length of recovery from minor perturbations becomes longer, meaning the system is less
volatile. This phenomenon is known as ‘critical slowing down’ in the dynamical complexity
literature and is an early warning sign of an abrupt movement (a phase transition) toward
an unstable state (Scholz et al., 1987).
Applying this idea to the Minskian theory of financial fragility requires a clarification
over what stability and resilience mean in an economic context. In Minsky’s own words,
Economies are complex multidimensional systems. Robustness and resilience
are two attributes which a system may possess. Robustness means that small
shocks to the system are absorbed without much difficulty; resilience means that
a system bounces back after a shock. Fragility negates robustness and resilience:
it, therefore, means that the response of the system to small disturbances or
small changes can be large and that after a disturbance the system does not
bounce back. (Minsky, 1995: 199)
For the purpose of analysis here, Minsky’s terminology will be slightly changed. Ro-
bustness and resilience will be treated as synonymous terms, both characterising the ability
to manage endogenous or exogenous changes and return to a ‘tranquil’ state. Specifying
stability is a far more tricky and ambiguous undertaking.
As Issing (2003: 1) notes, defining financial stability is difficult, as it places assumptions
over what the regular functioning of the economy is. The Minskian approach adopts a
vision of capitalist economies as self-destabilising, underscoring any statement on stability
as necessarily transient. This is further complicated by the fact that economic stability
is treated as a product of hedge financed units. It is plausible to suggest that a hedge-
dominated economy is both stable and resilient, meaning no trade-off may exist during the
early expansionary phases of the aggregate cycle. However, if stability is measured with
respect to asset price and output volatility, the trade-off is theoretically tenable. This is
to say that if high volatility characterises a system, the system is usually more resilient as
agents tend to be more risk-averse and pursue hedge financing. Therefore, any crisis-like
events, especially those that are exogenous (e.g., an oil-price shock) are absorbed by securely
financed firms.
Diminishing output and asset price volatility may cause a spike in risk-taking behaviours,
under the belief that systemic risk is low. This endogenous increase in systemic risk is de-
noted the ‘volatility paradox’ by Brunnermeier & Sannikov (2014), and explains how secular
changes in optimistic decision rules can create a resilience-stability trade-off situation. Dur-
ing times of low volatility, increased risk-taking is seen through financial innovation (e.g.
new derivative products) and ‘experimentation with liability structures’, both of which stem
from the belief that uncertainty is low (Minsky, 1986/2008: 199). The inflow of circulating
money causes inflationary pressures, corresponding to a steady rise in capital and financial
asset price, while strong demand supports aggregate output. As this trend continues, the
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system is marred by lowered resilience due to increased debt. Overall increases in debt are
not necessarily the problem in itself; it is more so that the amortisation schedule locks-in a
firm’s repayments over an extended period of time. As repayment time is extended in the
aggregate, the resilience of the macroeconomy is reduced, as any slight change in interest
rates or an exogenous supply-shock can create a protracted crisis.
The most prominent example of the resilience-stability trade-off may be the period
of low volatility preceding the Financial Crisis, the ‘Great Moderation’. From approxi-
mately the mid-1980’s to the beginning of the crisis in 2007, U.S. output, inflation and
employment volatility was remarkably low. Although tracing the emergence of the crisis to
over-optimistic debt financing (in housing) is only a partial explanation, the implied volatil-
ities of financial assets ‘suggest that the perceived risks in financial markets had shrunk to
extremely low levels by 2006’ (Bean, 2010: 296).
The resilience-stability trade-off can thus be used to theorise between the connection of
Minsky basic cycles and super-cycles. Recall basic cycles are the fluctuations in capitalist
systems marked by procyclical leverage that roughly follows the hedge-speculative-Ponzi
schema and lasts approximately a decade (Palley, 2011: 2-3). This is contrasted to the
super-cycle, which tracks the gradual evolution of increased fragility across several basic cy-
cles (ibid. 8). The super-cycle thus often corresponds to institutional and regulatory changes
towards a deregulated market environment, which becomes re-regulated after a protracted
recessionary phase. Following the dynamical complexity literature, lowered volatility of
basic cycles through a decline in amplitude or increase in duration may indicate critical
slowing down of the system and lowered resilience. As a result, identifying the patterns of
basic cycles may serve as an early warning sign of a potential downturn in the super-cycle.
2.4 Conclusion: Connecting the analytical levels
Complexity supposes that the connection between micro-, meso- and macro-levels, and the
interactions within these levels, are the components of interest in systems analysis. The
consequence of this is that traditional tools employed for analytical tractability become
irrelevant; equilibrium analysis, normal (Gaussian) distributions, rational expectations and
the representative agent are the most obvious victims of adopting a complexity framework.
It also implicates aspects of Minsky’s own work, as he adopts a representative agent to
justify the two-price theory and thus the financial instability hypothesis.
The technical argument presented in this chapter attempts to rectify the analytical levels
within a Minskian framework, by bringing in decision rule analysis and network theory.
Aggregate fluctuations and excess volatility arise from the financing decisions of boundedly
rational firms, who face an uncertain future and look to heuristic rules for guidance. The
adoption and dissemination of rules depend on the architecture of the economy and its
subsystems, such as the distribution of firms and interbank networks. As heuristics guide
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investment behaviour, speculative leveraging decisions can create socially-spread contagion
effects, resulting in cycles driven by optimistic and pessimistic ‘animal spirits’. As a result,
a rational decision at the level of the firm can create a maladaptive (e.g., crisis) outcome if
all agents follow suit, broadly illustrated through a resilience-stability trade-off.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical considerations in simulating com-
plex economies
The ideas presented so far bring forward the notion of Keynesian uncertainty in determining
the meso-level behaviour of firms and institutions, working through aggregate and dynamical
approaches to aggregate cycles. In a concretely non-equilibrium framework, the ontology
or ‘vision’ underlying this thesis is one of evolutionary dynamism, which is intractable and
cannot be holistically broached due to the epistemological limits of general complexity.
The modelling methodology of the agent-based framework directly confronts this epis-
temological quandary, and must wade through the problem of balancing parsimony and
realism. Agent-based models (ABMs) are computational tools that use programmed micro-
foundations to simulate emergent macrostructures, and do not face the standard tractabil-
ity constraints of the general equilibrium framework (Farmer & Foley, 2009: 685). Despite
suggestions that ABMs constitute a novel modelling paradigm (cf. Giulioni et al., 2017;
Cogliano & Jiang, 2016; Arslan, 2017) they must first address the problem of how to re-
duce the high-dimensionality associated with heterogeneous agents and multiple spheres of
interaction, while balancing reality and model parsimony.
This final chapter assesses Minskian agent-based models (ABMs) from a Minskian com-
plexity theoretic perspective, to identify the benefits and deficiencies in computational
treatments of the Minskian hypothesis. As a methodological counterpart to complexity eco-
nomics, ABMs developed alongside restricted complexity discourse, but have been picked
up by both Post Keynesian and New Keynesian practitioners. Amongst strong develop-
ments in computational methods, the complexity perspective is at risk of being minimised
or discarded entirely, with some ABMs turning into stylised dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models. That is, there may be a return to general equilibrium steady-
state analysis within ABMs, which relieves the computational weight of intractability, but
moves research into ‘solving’ endogenous fluctuations, rather than understanding the pos-
sible conditions of which fragility manifests.
ABMs are briefly introduced in Section 3.1, compared with and posed as a better al-
ternative to current DSGE and stock-flow consistent (SFC) models. Methodological issues
are also discussed, namely the problems of model calibration (estimation) and the study
of baseline scenarios as a complexity-minded replacement for equilibrium analysis. Moving
to specific Minskian ABMs in Section 3.2, the models are outlined relative to the themes
in Chapter 2, namely heterogeneity, speculative ‘animal spirits’, and network architecture.
Critically assessing these models in Section 3.3, however, requires a return to the arguments
set out in Chapter 1.
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3.1 Why agent-based modelling?
Models are reduced-form representations of social reality, employed for pedagogy, theoretical
exploration and policy-advice. Following general complexity, every conception of reality is a
model of some sort, whether expressed via narrative reasoning or equation-based formalisms.
Mainstream economics prefers the latter, envisioning a modelling space governed by the
axioms of general equilibrium. This space is built up by adding elements such as production
and consumption spheres, as well as abstract mechanisms to impose, for example, rigidities
(e.g., Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1989; Mankiw & Reis, 2007) and the (short-run) neutrality
of money (e.g., Lagos & Wright, 2005). Minsky (2015/1982: 61) denotes this the ‘village
fair paradigm’, which reduces a complex financial and monetary economy into a simple,
resolvable market.
Conversely, ABMs do not necessarily have any resolution by way of a closed form so-
lution, because the microfoundations are not analytically constrained in the manner of
standard economics (Salzano et al., 2007: xv). Using computational methods, ABMs are
flexible in the specification of agents, institutions and interactions, which create emergent
patterns as the model is simulated. This modelling framework is often orientated toward
a generative process analysis, which according to Epstein (2006: 19) involves asking, ‘how
could the decentralised local interactions of heterogeneous autonomous agents generate the
given regularity’? As such, ABMs can be treated as a computational experiment in itself
or a testing arena for some hypothesis about social reality (Phan & Varenne, 2010).
Aggregate complexity has co-developed alongside the agent-based framework, most ob-
vious when considering the essential characteristics of ABMs. Recall aggregate complexity
involves analysing the adaptive and evolutionary patterns that emerge between a boundedly
rational individual and a broader network. Similarly, Epstein (2006: 20) presents five core
characteristics of ABMs:
1. Agent heterogeneity in preferences, heuristics and social networks, that evolve over
time;
2. Decentralisation in agent behaviour;
3. Interactions that occur on an explicit mathematical space;
4. Agents have bounded interaction; and,
5. Agents are boundedly rational, and cannot know the exact path or macro-structures
that govern their actions.
ABMs have recently absorbed insights from the stock-flow consistency (SFC) literature
of PKE 1, through agent based-stock flow consistent (AB-SFC) models (e.g., Kinsella et
1For a review of the SFC literature, see Caverzasi & Godin (2013).
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al., 2011; Chakraborti et al., 2011; Berg et al., 2015; Caiani et al., 2016). AB-SFC models
respond to the need for an alternative modelling paradigm, while attempting to resolving
outstanding problems associated with the SFC literature. SFC models use a highly aggre-
gated accounting framework to track monetary stocks and flows, but are liable to the fallacy
of composition, the Lucas critique, and have been critiqued as empirically spurious (Kin-
sella, 2011). Additionally, the argument presented in Chapter 2 highlights the importance
of agent heterogeneity and endogenous rule changes in the emergence of financial fragility,
of which SFC models cannot handle due to static and exogenous behaviour rules.
Recent ABMs (e.g., Caiani et al., 2016) use stock-flow consistency as an internal vali-
dation check, to ensure any stock or flow of money is accounted for, i.e. a liability has a
corresponding asset on a balance sheet and vice versa. These AB-SFC models also adopt in-
sights from econophysics and econobiology, as the tools of standard economics are not well
equipped to manage non-equilibrium multi-agent frameworks (e.g., Kinsella et al., 2011;
Chakraborti et al., 2011; Berg et al., 2015).
3.1.1 Replacing equilibrium with baseline scenarios
The use of equilibrium within macro-modelling is conceptually comforting. It creates model
determinacy through the presence of a solution, or at least a constrained range of solutions
when there are multiple equilibria. General complexity and the Minskian framework suppose
that Walrasian equilibrium does not exist in any meaningful sense, bringing into question
the relevance of equilibrium analysis2. ABMs present an alternative modelling methodology
to equilibrium solutions, by establishing a baseline scenario and then ‘experimenting’ with
model changes. Although a multi-agent framework does not necessarily negate the possi-
bility of closed-form equilibrium solutions (e.g., Assenza et al., 2010), many ABMs follow a
procedure of (i) specifying the theoretical microfoundations of interest, (ii) calibrating pa-
rameters to produce a baseline simulation of stylised facts, and (iii) systematically testing
alternative scenarios by changing relevant variables or behavioural rules.
Akin to an experimental ‘control’, accurate estimation of the baseline scenario is key to
a robust model. However, the method of establishing a baseline is a point of theoretical
divergence; an ABM can turn into a stylised DSGE model through the use of represen-
tative agents in estimating the parameters of the baseline scenario, which can be solved
for an equilibrium-like steady-state solution. The consequence is model simplicity through
ergodicity, characteristic of the mainstream approach.
In the context of computational models, the estimation procedure refers to the process
of assigning values to model parameters that reflect empirical regularities or data. Follow-
2Furthermore, Walrasian price equilibrium given utility maximising agents and convex production func-
tions is intractable within computational economics (see Roughgarden, 2010) with some orientating research
toward computational proof of non-existence (e.g., Roughgarden & Talgam-Cohen, 2015). This is a form
of computational complexity, that falls under restricted approaches, but is unfortunately out of the scope of
this paper.
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ing Richiardi et al. (2006: 20), ‘estimation’ and ‘calibration’ of an ABM can be treated
synonymously, as both relate to the procedure of configuring model parameters. It is im-
perative that the initial estimation be empirically robust if ABMs are to be considered tools
for policy-making. Incorrect or biased estimation can lead to spurious model results, which
is an underlying problem in the ABM literature as calibration methods are sometimes left
unexplained (Caiani et al., 2016: 388). Computational DSGE models, as the standard class
of orthodox models, have the benefit of having extensive literature on estimation procedures
and thus an array of generalisable techniques (see e.g., Gomme et al., 2013). ABMs are com-
paratively less developed, but research is ongoing regarding finding a standard estimation
procedure (e.g., Caiani et al., 2016).
There are several significant roadblocks to a standard procedure. Firstly, modelling
methodologies are heterogeneous, and no uniform standard is currently accepted. Secondly,
ABMs can handle many more parameters than DSGE models and can result in a model
that is nonergodic and thus algorithmically unsolvable. Algorithmically derived equilibrium
solutions offer formal closure by binding values to a unique or range (i.e. multiple equilibria)
of steady-states. This reductionism makes the system probabilistically tractable and reduces
the system path to a narrow range. In nonergodic ABMs, the system path is not unique, so
choosing a baseline scenario can become an ad hoc or arbitrary choice between an infinite
range of possible trajectories. Put differently, the baseline may not be robust.
The two primary methods of getting around the robustness problem in ABMs are:
1. Systematically changing parameters to bracket a solution that creates the phenomenon
of interest or replicates stylised facts, which is simulated numerically. Doing so gener-
ates a sufficiency theorem, but is manually intensive to the point of being ‘prohibitively
slow’ (Grasselli & Li, 2017: 2). It is also open to the curse of dimensionality, as con-
tinual runs of a complex ABM with high dimensionality has computational limits
(Axtell, 2000). Nevertheless, this method retains nonergodicity, is not constrained by
equilibrium concepts, and has proven to be a successful tool in PKE (e.g., Dosi et al.,
2010).
2. Using the master equation approach of statistical mechanics to create ergodicity. This
method involves aggregating agents into groups, to create a statistically ‘average’
representative agent. From here, system movement is reduced to a set of differential
equations that represent, in probabilistic terms, macroeconomic trajectories. The
ABM becomes analytically solvable as system states are compressed in an ergodic
manner, resulting in the possibility of a steady-state. The master equation can be
thought of as a blend of econophysics in a New Keynesian framework, and has been
shown to significantly reduce computational burden (Grasselli & Li, 2017).
The sufficiency theorem approach retains nonergodicity as a connecting concept between
complexity, ABMs and Minskian theories. Conversely, master equations are a simplifying
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device that turns the many-body problem of ABMs into a representative agent problem,
skipping over the meso-level of analysis entirely. Justification for the master-equation ap-
proach stems from mean-field theory, which states that interactions converge to a statistical
average captured in the representative agent (see Grasselli & Li, 2017). The model becomes
ergodic, and Keynesian uncertainty is ruled out.
The master equation approach gives primacy to the solution of a model rather than the
constituent processes, such as rule-based learning and network interactions. For example,
Di Guilmi et al. (2015), adopt the master equation framework in a Minskian ABM, using
numerical simulations and equilibrium solutions to analyse the role of heterogeneous agents
in leverage and capital accumulation cycles. Use of a master-equation allows the determina-
tion of the long-run stochastic path of the artificial economy, which exhibits Minskian cycles
of pro-cyclical leverage. It is found that if firms are more sensitive to changes in cash flows,
cyclical patterns are pronounced, as aggregate debt tends to rise more strongly in response
to a relatively small increase in cash flows. However, Di Guilmi et al. (2015) removes the
interaction between agents as a source of macroeconomic volatility. The model itself does
not tend toward equilibrium but is solved for steady-state values, giving priority to stability
conditions over the underlying meso-level processes influencing investment strategies.
Even withstanding the problems associated with a sufficiency theorem approach, it
retains nonergodicity and by definition, Keynesian uncertainty, putting weight on the con-
ditions of aggregate cycles over model closure. The sufficiency theorem aligns with Minsky’s
call for simulation as an experimental device:
The short durations of crises means that the smoothing operations that go into
data generations as well as econometric analysis will tend to minimise the im-
portance of crises. Because of such factors, it might be that the most meaningful
way to test propositions as to the cause and effect of financial instability will
be through simulation studies, where the simulation models are designed to re-
flect alternative ways that financial instability can be induced [emphasis added].
(Minsky, 1970: 4, as cited in Giulioni et al., 2017: 297-298).
3.2 A review of Minskian ABMs
In most cases, the ABM literature can be decomposed by the estimation procedures used.
New Keynesian approaches tend to follow a master equation method that uses the baseline as
a quasi-steady-state equilibrium (e.g., Di Guilmi et al., 2015; Caiani et al., 2016), while Post
Keynesian models can be partially identified by the utilisation of a sufficiency theorem (e.g.,
Dosi et al., 2010; Seppecher & Salle, 2017). In terms of testing and replicating the Minskian
fragility hypothesis, both approaches have been taken (cf. Assenza et al., 2010; Seppecher &
Salle, 2015; Seppecher et al., 2016). Although differences in methodology somewhat block
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deep comparison of model results, if it is accepted that retaining a complex ontology is an
essential philosophical backbone of ABMs, Minskian models using a sufficiency approach
already have a head start.
What follows is an assessment of various ABMs that attempt to capture Minskian
dynamics using the sufficiency theorem approach to trace the processes governing aggregate
cycles. The central point here argues that increased complexity is a double-edged sword,
increasing sensitivity to network interaction and dynamical complexity, but at the cost of
parsimony - discussed by the end of the chapter.
3.2.1 Agent heterogeneity and credit networks
The role of agent heterogeneity in macroeconomic stability is presented by Assenza et
al. (2010) in a simple Minskian ABM, extended with the addition of credit networks via
Delli Gatti (2012). These models highlight the importance of firm heterogeneity and network
interactions as proximate mechanisms of financial fragility; that is, the agent heterogeneity
and the degree to which they are connected are hypothesised to impact firm behaviour and
macroeconomic stability.
Assenza et al. (2010) compares a numerically simulated heterogeneous agent model
with a simplified master equation approach, a representative agent model. The heterogene-
ity among firms is defined through their financial condition, imputed through a stochastic
equity ratio drawn from a normal distribution with positive variance. In the representative
model, the distribution of the equity ratio has zero variance, equivalent to rational expecta-
tions. In both cases, the causal driver of behaviour mostly echoes the Minskian formation:
financially constrained firms seek capital accumulation and profit maximisation. However,
expectations are one-period backward looking (Assenza et al., 2010: 192-195), limiting the
extent to which historical context and memory play a role in investment decisions. Firms
are financially constrained regarding investment, and lender-borrower risk is captured via
a countercyclical external finance premium viz. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Kiyotaki &
Moore (1997) and interest rate on loans. These factors determine the pace of investment
and credit-equity financing. The representative agent case of Assenza et al. (2010: 198-199)
aggregates into an IS-LM framework, employing equilibrium analysis around the linearisa-
tion of investment ratios and the endogenous determination of interest rates. Although also
analysable through an IS-LM approach, the heterogeneous agent case employs nonlinear
equations with stochastic shocks and is instead numerically simulated.
Model results demonstrate that financial heterogeneity is a dampening factor in cyclical
fluctuations, comparative to the representative agent case. In the former, output gap,
interest rate and average equity ratio volatility are markedly reduced. The explanation for
increased stability with heterogeneous agents stems from the negative correlation between
mean and variance in heterogenous agents: in the textbook IS-LM case of a representative
43
agent, expansionary monetary policy increases investment, increasing mean equity ratio and
leaving variance unchanged. If agents have heterogenous financing conditions, a decline in
interest rates positively impacts the cross-sectional mean of equity ratios by reducing the
interest burden on outstanding credit debts. As a result, the variance of the cross-sectional
mean declines, leading heterogeneity to be a factor in lowered aggregate volatility. At
first glance, these results appear orthogonal to resilience-stability trade-off outlined in the
previous chapter. However, the model of Assenza et al. (2010) does not generate protracted
recessionary periods by design, but may be indicative of the period preceding ‘irrational
exuberance’ (Shiller, 2000) marked by low volatility in returns.
Assenza et al. (2010) provide an example of a Minskian ABM that is not complex. It does
involve heterogeneous agents that create an emergent reduction in macroeconomic volatility,
but there is no agent interaction nor evolution. Additionally, there are no opinion dynamics
that simulate ‘animal spirits’, with heterogeneity and homogeneity relegated to stochastic
equity ratio rather than behaviour rules. Furthermore, the specification of one-period adap-
tive expectations dismisses the importance of historical path-dependent trajectories in the
formation of decisions. The problem of interaction, however, is partially addressed through
a network theory extension of the model by Delli Gatti (2012).
Delli Gatti (2012) extends the Assenza et al. (2010) model to include a complex credit
network, which allows the determination of investment to be related to agent robustness,
i.e. equity ratios, and the robustness of related agents. Agent actions and impacts, such as
bankruptcy, can therefore impact other linked nodes depending on the agents’ degree and
weight of the links. Following Battiston et al. (2012) (as cited in Delli Gatti, 2012: 13) this
is represented as a ‘law of motion of robustness’ of an agent i = 1, 2, .., N in time t:
dai =
k∑
j=1
Wijaj − ai + σ√
k
k∑
j=1
Wijdξj − αq(k)
Where a is the robustness of agent i 6= j, W is the weight of a link between agents, k
represents the degree of an node, and ξ is an idiosyncratic shock with standard deviation σ.
α is the amplitude of a decline in robustness, with q the probability of a continued decline
dependent on the degree, k.
This equation states that the change of robustness of node i (dai) is dependent on
the net robustness of neighbouring nodes (
∑k
j=1Wijaj − ai), the impact of a idiosyncratic
shock (dξj) across the network (
σ√
k
∑k
j=1Wijdξj), and some positive feedback mechanism
(−αq(k)). It formalises the theory that increased network connectivity allows for the dis-
persion of idiosyncratic risk via risk sharing, at the cost of escalating systemic risk. If
the degree of a node is increasing, i.e. k increases, the robustness dai increases. How-
ever, −αq(k) allows for positive trend reinforcement, acting as a ‘network based financial
accelerator’ (Delli Gatti, 2012: 13).
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This idiosyncratic-systemic risk trade-off is consistent with the ideas of Chapter 2, along
with other ABMs that find a similar result (cf. Riccetti et al., 2013): ‘the larger the number
of connected neighbours, the smaller the risk of an individual collapse but the higher sys-
temic risk and therefore the lower network resilience’ (Delli Gatti, 2012: 15). It is a partial
inclusion of aggregate complexity via networks, but the ‘positive trend reinforcement’ is
conceptually underdeveloped. Under the Keynesian perspective, this gap may be addressed
through an investigation into the opinion dynamics underlying sentiment.
3.2.2 Opinion dynamics and animal spirits
Opinion dynamics can be modelled through decision-rules, as outlined in the previous chap-
ter. The ABMs considered below attempt to simulate Minskian (basic) cycles by specifying
simple or complex decision rule processes as the drivers of optimism and pessimism. For this
paper, simple and complex rules are differentiated by how agents adopt the rule. Namely,
simple endogenous rule changes can arise from an individual’s assessment of their situation
without mesoeconomic interaction with other actors. These introspective rules are triv-
ial; simple rules are indiscriminate (no learning) and usually involve a one-step backward
looking (adaptive) expectations function, based on economic aggregates, as in Assenza et
al. (2010). In contrast, complex rules involve social transmission (e.g., social learning), or
iteratively established through trial-and-error. In these scenarios, the model can simulate
agent cognition under a dynamically adaptive process.
A toy model of simple decision rules is presented by Ormerod (2002), which successfully
replicates the cumulative distribution of the size of recessions in the United States. Namely,
it attempts to explain an earlier finding that recessions follow a power law-like relationship
between frequency and size of duration (see Ormerod & Mounfield, 2001). The model
specifies heterogenous firms under uncertainty, differentiated by size drawn from a power
law distribution, operating on a complete topology - all firms (nodes) are connected to
one another, causing every individual firm to have complete information about the prior
period. As such, the network is not complex, but as will be outlined, it is nonergodic
through the inclusion of Keynesian uncertainty. The firm makes two decisions in every
period to determine (i) production output growth rate, and (ii) whether they are optimistic
or pessimistic.
A reduced form of this model is presented by Ormerod et al. (2007: 203-204), who denote
output growth rate (xi,t) of agent i in time t, as the sum of the prior period sentiment (yi)
of all firms, weighted by size (wi), with a stochastic factor (εi,t) to represent uncertainty
3:
xi,t =
∑
i
wi,t−1yi,t−1 + εi,t
3Notation has been modified for consistency.
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Notably, εi,t is drawn from a normal distribution and is also established independently
for each agent. Keynesian uncertainty thus enters into the model by allowing agents to have
independent, stochastic signals.
Sentiment yi,t is determined by a simple decision rule:
yi,t = (1− β)yi,t−1 − β
[∑
i
wi,t−1xi,t−1 + ηi,t
]
This states that current sentiment is oscillating according to the subjective weight β a
firm gives to sentiment and aggregate weighted output in the prior period. The negative
sign for β allows this dampened oscillation: given a constant β, rising aggregate (weighted)
output eventually results in a downward revision in sentiment leading to cyclical fluctua-
tions (Ormerod, 2002: 779). Additionally, the term ηi,t represents a normally distributed
stochastic factor, drawn independently for each firm.
This model demonstrates that a simple oscillating opinion dynamic can simulate endoge-
nous cycles, empirically robust concerning the power law-like characteristic of recessions. It
is made inherently uncertain by specifying the independence of stochastic factors between
agents and there is no maximising principle in the model. The fully connected topology
negates the possibility for systemic risk to spread via the architecture of the system, as was
specified for interbank networks in Delli Gatti (2012). It follows to ask whether further
including restricted complexity can provide a more robust understanding the constituent
features of aggregate cycles.
De Grauwe & Macchiarelli (2015) form an ABM to explore how changes in heuristics
and sentiment create aggregate fluctuations, finding that the incorporation of opinion dy-
namics generates self-fulfilling endogenous cycles. Relative to New Keynesian models of
self-fulfilling cycles, which adopt informational rigidities to force inertia under rational ex-
pectations and Bayesian learning, De Grauwe & Macchiarelli (2015) use endogenous rule
switching that does not converge to an equilibrium point - there is dynamical complexity.
Agents experience contagion in heuristics, which become correlated in optimistic expansion-
ary and pessimistic contractionary phases of the cycle. De Grauwe & Macchiarelli (2015)
thus present a model closely aligning to a Minskian complexity theory, relative to the previ-
ous models explored. Unfortunately, model calibration is mostly unspecified by De Grauwe
& Macchiarelli (2015), with only the estimated parameters of the model presented.
The simulated macroeconomy is set up through aggregate demand-supply (AD-AS)
equations and an inflation targeting Taylor rule, determining the exogenous interest rate
set by the central bank. Populating the model are agents whose positions (e.g., firms, house-
holds) are captured within the AD-AS. These agents adopt and switch between two decision
rules plus some subjective weight, with the weight reflecting the historical performance of
a rule and memory of the agent. There is a fundamentalist rule, which bases expectations
on the steady-state value of the output gap and target inflation rate, and an extrapolative
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rule that uses the prior observation for output and inflation to form forecasts (De Grauwe
& Macchiarelli, 2015: 97). The determination of weights is endogenous, meaning the weight
ascribed to a rule is increased (decreased) if it performs well (poorly). Rule switching is then
an iterative process, requiring a continual comparison between the two rules. Sentiment is
defined by the bias of the forecast: if it is biased upward, the agent is optimistic and if it is
biased downward, they are pessimistic.
Model results show that ‘waves of optimism and pessimism’ are more persistent with
money endogeneity, leading to larger swings in the output gap (De Grauwe & Macchiarelli,
2015: 109). The length of memory is found to have an impact on the ‘animal spirits’,
as no opinion-led cycles occurred in the case of no memory and perfect memory (rational
expectations) (De Grauwe, 2011: 439-440). This finding echoes the suggestion of Minsky
(1986/2008: 199, 299), who stated booms and busts are somewhat dependent on our ability
to forget past crises, even though overall, we learn from mistakes. The overall Minskian
hypothesis is supported: numerical simulations show that expansionary periods increase the
value of firms’ financial assets, leading banks to reduce interest rate spread and creating
a self-fulfilling boom. In a downturn, an increase in the spread on loans corresponds to
generalised pessimism.
The message here is that a model with complex opinion dynamics can be successfully
simulated without adopting a master-equation approach. It is not a resolute determination
of ‘laws’ governing endogenous cycles, but the above ABMs do raise points of note in the
ways cognition and learning can be modelled in a dynamic context. These ideas are further
developed within the ABMs of Seppecher & Salle (2015); Seppecher et al. (2016, 2017);
Seppecher & Salle (2017), which represent Minskian models sensitive toward complexity.
Although extensive treatment is not given here, Seppecher & Salle (2015) and Seppecher
et al. (2016) are critically appraised as state-of-the-art ABMs, opening up discussion for
future research.
3.2.3 Toward complexity models of Minskian dynamics
Behavioural AB-SFC models are developed by Seppecher & Salle (2015) and Seppecher et al.
(2016), to simulate the emergence and dynamics of endogenous medium-term cycles using
the sufficiency theorem approach. The first model by Seppecher & Salle (2015) is in a similar
spirit to that of De Grauwe & Macchiarelli (2015); swings in optimism and pessimism are
specified through an opinion dynamic, translating into macroeconomic patterns of stability
and deleveraging crises. The second model of Seppecher et al. (2016) uses a similar modelling
environment (i.e., set up and Jamel program), but focuses on complex adaptation and
learning among interacting agent. Both macro-models are specified in firm, household,
financial and central banking sectors, but only involves a single bank, a point that will be
returned to. For ease of discussion, the former model is referred to as the ‘deleveraging’
ABM, and the latter is denoted the ‘learning’ ABM. As of the writing of this paper, these
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represent leading ABMs that adopt complex systems thinking within a Minskian model.
The ‘deleveraging’ ABM finds that simulated crises reflect Fisherian debt-deflation sce-
narios, with macroeconomic recovery dependent on income, prices and wages (Seppecher
& Salle, 2015: 3787). Agent heterogeneity is an emergent product of the model, with ini-
tial microspecifications (e.g., asset endowments, expectations functions) being homogenous
across agents. Seppecher & Salle (2015: 3772) presents the ‘procedural rationality’ and
‘heterogeneity’ as the foundational concepts of the model, with the former relating to the
evolution of bounded rationality through time, and the latter relating to the heterogeneity
of opinions.
The opinion dynamics of households have both introspective and ‘animal spirits’ com-
ponents; that is, for n total households, household i assesses their individual state of
(un)employment and also looks outward to the consumer sentiment of h < n local house-
holds, in every period. The probability that the household depends on introspection, or
relies on the majority opinion (pessimistic or optimistic) is respectively 1− p and p. Simi-
larly, for m total firms, opinions dictate the level of financing undertaken through a single
bank. Firms calculate the wage cost of full employment in their production, and if this
wage bill is higher than current cash flows, a firm borrows. Each firm has a leverage target,
the goal ratio between debt and total assets, with optimistic firms having high leverage ob-
jectives, and pessimistic having low leverage objectives. The ‘animal spirits’ component of
opinion is identical to that of households but is introspective in regard to the level of excess
inventories, which proxies output demand. If a firm is experiencing low inventories (high
demand), the firm is optimistic, and vice versa. The same probabilities as the household
apply, i.e. firms look at their own situation with probability 1 − p, and adopt majority
opinion with probability p.
The baseline scenario of the model replicates some stylised macroeconomic facts. It
can produce procyclicality in consumption, employment, changes in inventories, and the
velocity of money Seppecher & Salle (2015: 3780). Additionally, the firm size distribution
is not normally distributed and exhibits positive skewness, indicating that it may be power
law distributed as is outlined in Chapter 2. The simulation also reveals six phases of a
business cycle, with aggregate volatility increasing as opinion dynamics are strengthened,
i.e. rising probability p that majority opinion heuristics are employed (Figure. 3.1):
1. The economy enters a stable phase, denoted the ‘corridor of stability’;
2. There is an economic slowdown that causes a decline in profits and employment, with
inflation turning to deflation;
3. The economy ‘bottom’s out’ with maximum unemployment and deflation, and a min-
imum profit share’;
4. There is a recovery;
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5. Boom with high inflation and low unemployment;
6. The economy returns to the corridor of stability.
Figure 3.1: Phases of the business cycle with respect to inflation, the profit share and
unemployment (Seppecher & Salle, 2015: 3780).
The cyclical pattern reflects movement toward and away from a Fisherian debt defla-
tion, endogenous stimulated by contagion effects of pessimistic opinions in those initially
optimistic. There is no equilibrium analysis whatsoever, though the corridor of stability
mirrors the Robinsonian term, ‘periods of tranquillity’ borrowed by Minsky (1986/2008:
197).
Results of the ABM are consistent with Minsky’s diagnosis of aggregate fluctuations.
Namely, Seppecher & Salle (2015) find that macroeconomic recoveries are stronger with
inflexible nominal wages, as rigidities cause a increase in real wages during the delever-
aging process. A rise in real wages stimulates a demand-driven recovery through support
to consumption. Minsky (1986/2008: 197-198) suggested that declining wages during a
deleveraging period erode the profitability of firms by diminishing consumption, causing
failure to service outstanding debt obligations. An alternative scenario with increased nom-
inal wage flexibility is simulated and is found to cause mass firm bankruptcies and a systemic
banking crisis, causing the ABM to stop (Seppecher & Salle, 2015: 2786).
Further refining these ideas, Seppecher et al. (2016) build a Minskian ABM with com-
plexity insights. Namely, the model exhibits sensitivity to a general complexity ontology
and considers evolutionary aggregate complexity through an adaptive learning mechanism,
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the ‘blanketing shotgun process’ (BSP) of Alchian (1950). The BSP states that agents
consciously adapt leverage strategies via imitating successful agents, with the objective of
positive profits as opposed to maximisation. Seppecher et al. (2016: 11) outlines three
mechanisms of the BSP: (1) positive profits (rather than maximal) reinforce behaviours
and act like a natural selection process, (2) mimesis of the endogenously determined suc-
cessful firms, (3) innovation due to modifications to the imitation of successful strategies.
Unlike standard versions of Darwinian evolution in economics (e.g., genetic algorithms), the
BSP allows non-convergence to arise from imperfect imitation, which is also an avenue of
innovation.
The aggregate complexity ideas of Holland (1992b,a) acts as a way to confront the
general complexity of social reality, specifying the economy as a complex adaptive system
due to the reflexive learning capacity of agents. The theoretical object of Seppecher et al.
(2016) is a system of continual adaptation, with macrostructures coproduced by agents that
experience and produce feedback effects. Because of this continually changing modelling
environment, the comparison of agent strategies between qualitatively unique state spaces
is difficult, as each strategy is only understood relative to the context it existed (Seppecher
et al., 2016: 9).
The BSP produces pro-cyclical leverage ratios, and behavioural convergence during a
recessionary period. Behavioural convergence arises as the sustained indebtedness of high
leverage targets begins by affecting large firms, and then spreads through imitation to
smaller firms, resulting in systemic fragility. Figure 3.2 illustrates these changes, with each
square denoting a firm and the upper right side represents large firms with high debt targets.
The blue, yellow and red colours respectively denote Minskian hedge, speculative and Ponzi
firms.
Although there is always a concentration of small and low debt targeting firms, the
beginning of the downturn (a) and the maximal point of the boom (f) exhibit dispersion
toward large firms and high debt levels. The simulated economy then undergoes a ‘brutal’
correction as large firms go bankrupt and risk-taking agents re-evaluate their strategies
(Seppecher et al., 2016: 30). Furthermore, enlarged aggregate debt is driven by a minority
of firms that are disproportionately large. Accordingly, a severe Fisherian debt deflation
occurs (observed in Figure 3.2 (b) and (c)), due to an endogenous rise in commercial bank
interest rates in period t = 1000, which corresponds to the beginning of the downturn
(Seppecher et al., 2016: 32).
The outstanding limitation of this model is the specification of the one-bank banking
sector. The ‘deleveraging’ model has a ‘passive’ fully accommodative bank that recapitalises
debt of bankrupt firms (Seppecher & Salle, 2015: 3779). Although the bank is extended in
the ‘learning’ model through allowing multiple types of loans (e.g., short-run non-amortised,
long-run amortised), it remains ‘very stylized [sic]’ (Seppecher et al., 2016: 18, 23). As
discussed in the previous chapter and illustrated by Delli Gatti (2012), a multiple bank
50
Figure 3.2: Share of hedge (blue), speculative (yellow) and Ponzi (red) firms across the
cycle, from period 1000 to 1250 (Seppecher et al., 2016: 29).
network is imperative to understanding the dynamics of risk. Through the Minskian lens, a
bank is an agential unit who actively discriminates through credit rationing and the interest
spread. This critique, among others, is taken up to conclude this chapter and point forward
for recommendations for future research.
3.3 The limitations of ABMs
The computational limits of ABMs can be dealt with via reducing a sphere or several sectors
of the simulated economy. Seppecher & Salle (2015) and Seppecher et al. (2016) do this by
employing a highly stylised banking sector with only one bank. All models discussed use
this reductionism to reduce computational burden. There is limitation of agent interaction
(Assenza et al., 2010), adoption of a complete topology with low-cognition agents Ormerod
et al. (2007) and a restriction of rule switching between two choices, e.g., fundamental-
ist and extrapolative (De Grauwe & Macchiarelli, 2015) or introspection and conventional
judgement (Seppecher & Salle, 2015). Removing a banking network is particularly prob-
lematic however, because it removes the possibility of analysing inter-bank networks as a
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propagation mechanism for risk. As the earlier chapter outlined, the architecture of the
banking system may play a significant role in dampening or amplifying systemic risk, and
negation of a complex banking structure in an ABM of financial fragility could limit the
fecundity of model insights.
These reductions bring forward the problem of model parsimony in ABMs. In theory,
ABMs can simulate complex multi-sector dynamics from highly detailed microfoundations,
spanning many variables and tracking their movement. OSullivan et al. (2012: 113) argue
that in this case, ‘we simply replace one difficult to understand phenomenon - the world itself
- with an equally hard to understand model’. The causal relationships may be difficult to
untangle in a complex ABM, with extensive parameters overfitting the data in the baseline
calibration. The response to this, and the opinion put forward in this thesis, is that ABMs
are orientated toward process analysis rather than prediction. Increasing the complexity
of a model is less of a problem in this case, because the ABM acts as an experimental
scenario to validate hypothesis. In this case, however, ABMs may be critiqued as ‘thought
experiments’ comparative to parsimonious and empirically robust DSGE models. This
critique must delve into policy implications, which is out of the scope of this paper, but it
may be the case that pedagogical exploration of ABMs must precede policy; ABMs are still
embryonic compared to contemporary DSGE models, so there is significant space to cover
in terms of the limits and successes of computational modelling.
Another associated problem with ABMs is the heterogeneity in method. There is no
uniform protocol in model analysis, exemplified by the difference in master equation and
sufficiency theorem approaches. This problem goes beyond model design, as even the soft-
ware programs used to execute simulations are heterogeneous in programming language and
created ad hoc for a specific researcher(s) or model, e.g., the Jamel program is used only for
the works associated with Seppecher & Salle (2015) and Seppecher et al. (2016). Although
the methodology is robust, Richiardi et al. (2006: 17) comment that this modelling freedom
has led to ‘anarchy (in terms design, analysis and presentation)’. These are not problems
that the complexity framework can solve because these are problems of the epistemological
freedom of complexity itself.
These problems highlight the necessary role for a guiding theory or theoretical framework
in economic modelling. In this paper, the complexity framework acts as a lens to fill the
gaps between analytical levels in a Minskian framework. It builds on an existing foundation
and reworks meso-level details in such a way that is sensitive to ontological and restricted
complexity. Although this paper does not build and present a novel ABM, it may be a
useful suggestion that ABMs begin to similarly work through existing frameworks, or at
minimum, find an acceptable standard of model design.
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3.4 Conclusion: Strengthening the links
A Minskian complexity theoretic approach requires a methodology that captures noner-
godicity at its most basic level. Keynesian uncertainty is the natural result of model non-
ergodicity, and ABMs that remove this facet by employing a representative agent viz. a
master equation approach turn ABMs into stylised DSGE models. To avoid this and in-
crease the system complexity of a simulated economy, the sufficiency theorem should be
employed, which replaces equilibrium analysis with process analysis. Nevertheless, there
are computational limits to doing so, a concern that also flows into model design.
The ABMs presented do not draw absolute causal lines, but open points of interest in
terms of modelling endogenous fluctuations. Assenza et al. (2010) and Delli Gatti (2012)
demonstrate that agent heterogeneity is a dampening factor in terms of aggregate volatility,
with network interaction creating a trade-off between the mitigation of idiosyncratic risk
and the increase in systemic risk. Ormerod et al. (2007) allows for Keynesian uncertainty
within a simple decision rule model, and De Grauwe & Macchiarelli (2015) demonstrate
how complex adaptive rules create self-fulfilling swings in output and inflation. Finally,
Seppecher & Salle (2015) and Seppecher et al. (2016) exemplify a state-of-the-art complex
ABM of Minskian dynamics. These represent models that are complex, drawing primar-
ily on the insights of aggregate complexity and econobiology. Although all the models
discussed are heterogeneous in methodology, those that absorb complex systems thinking
give a heightened understanding to processes, rather than simply describing how simple
specifications can produce endogenous cycles.
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Conclusion
In a post-crisis world faced with rapid computational advances, it is not surprising that
many theorists have suggested complexity and ABMs pave a way forward in economics
(e.g. Colander et al., 2003; Farmer & Foley, 2009). As separate frameworks, Minskian
and complexity approaches have asymptotically converged; both hold similar conclusions
with respect to the core sources of financial instability and the need for enlarged financial
regulation, even whilst adopting distinct epistemological and methodological frameworks.
Theorists like Rosser Jr (2006, 2010) have argued for a unification between complexity and
Post Keynesian frameworks, hinting at Minsky as a potential entry point into exploring the
endogenous, evolutionary nature of financial fragility. Cross-fertilisation between frame-
works is seen in the recent agent based-stock flow consistent models of Seppecher et al.
(2016), whom investigate the evolutionary process of imperfect learning as the source of
aggregate fluctuations.
The cyclical emergence, expression and curtailment of financial fragility are complex
phenomena, and it is fitting that the theory and methodology used to conceptualise aggre-
gate fluctuations be sensitive to this complexity. This thesis provides an example of one
way this can be done, by joining the Minskian hypothesis and complex systems thinking.
A complexity interpretation of Minsky’s theories has been fruitful in two central re-
gards. Firstly, financial complexity economics, whilst producing empirically robust and
novel methodologies, does not have concrete ontological precepts unique to economics. In
other words, complexity theory is a systems theory with strong linage in computational
methods, but it does not constitute an economic theory. Secondly, Minsky has been cri-
tiqued as subjecting his theories to the fallacy of composition (Lavoie & Seccareccia, 2001:
83), and did not formalise his ideas into empirically testable models during his lifetime.
Minsky, endowed with a pre-analytic vision built upon Keynes and Schumpeter, has the
strong theoretical foundation that complexity lacks.
The primary focus of this thesis surrounds the development of a meso-level of analy-
sis. It works through the microfoundations provided by Minsky in the financial instability
hypothesis and the two-price theory of investment. Mesoeconomic principles, illustrated
through decision-rule analysis and network interaction, add depth to the Minskian oeuvre
by point to possible resolutions to the fallacy of composition. Speculation under uncer-
tainty need not be abstract, metaphysical terms. Decision-rules can be concretely defined
following Keynes (1921), and set up through ABMs as the causal determinants of ‘animal
spirits - the speculative swings in optimism and pessimism.
There must be a warning however: complexity is methodologically strong, but agnos-
tic in its orientation toward economic theory. Because of this, there is a sufficient threat
that complexity becomes (i) synonymous with one concept, i.e., ‘emergence or ‘dynamical
systems, or (ii) employed as a methodology, without acknowledging ontology or epistemol-
ogy. If either of these paths are taken, complexity is a project of mainstream economics,
54
or a transdisciplinary field that is inapplicable to understanding economic phenomena. As
a fairly embryonic discipline, the tools of econobiology and econophysics can be cherry-
picked and successfully absorbed into a general equilibrium framework. Networking theory
has no fundamental principles orthogonal to general equilibrium, and ABMs can be turned
into stylised DSGE models through the master equation. To combat this, there must be a
sensitivity to a complex ontology and epistemology. Simplifying tools, such as the central
limit theorem and the master equation are untenable if it accepted that social reality is
complex, uncertain and nonergodic. However, if general complexity does indeed allow for
pluralistic method, and posits the importance of local narratives - why should these tools
be discarded?
The central limit theorem and other simplifying principles (e.g., convex utility functions)
suppress the realm of theory building through axiomatic instrumental rationalism. In the
social sciences, axioms allow privileging of one mode of thought over another, and force
not only model closure but also dialogical closure. Culture, power, ideology and human
inventiveness cannot be compressed into stochastic processes, and the economy cannot be
‘solved’ through a first-order approximation. There is no cognitive division between humans
as emotional beings and as maximising agents. Both enter into economic processes, the
latter is just ‘nicer’ to model.
Furthermore, mainstream economics treats methodology as social reality - at least to a
degree sufficient to cause Lucas (2003: 1) to comment, ‘[the] central problem of depression
prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact been solved for many
decades’. Faithfulness to the general equilibrium theory of Arrow & Debreu (1954) has
enforced tractability as the forefront of concern, creating a secular movement towards a
rhetoric that supposes the economy tends to move toward a Walrasian equilibrium. The
project of complexity, within a heterodox framework, is to enforce the division between
reality and representation. All conceptions, whether aggregate complexity models of spec-
ulative contagion or dynamical models of chaotic financial markets, are representations.
Treating them as reality is a conceptual misstep, and bringing heterodox discourse into
complexity analysis can alleviate this problem. Heterodox thought in complexity economics
conceptualises the macroeconomy as a network of interaction with potentially maladaptive
outcomes. Stylising such complexity into functions and equations requires consideration
over what statements are being made about the nature of social reality.
To conclude, it should be briefly mentioned that the bridge between PKE, complexity
and ABMs is only one of many. Indeed, the structuration of feedback processes between
the micro- and macroeconomy echo aspects of ecological Marxism, particularly around the
notion of internal contradictions. The systemic conflict of adaptations at distinct analytical
levels has also been compared to the Hegelian dialectic by Zwick (1978). Network interac-
tions may be reworked under a poststructuralist/post-Marxist lens through interactionism,
performativity and agency within the dimensions of the capitalist structure. Future re-
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search may choose to follow these routes and add to the much needed theoretical richness
of complexity in political economy.
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